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AGENTS WITHOUT PRINCIPALS: THE ECONOMIC
CONVERGENCE OF THE NONPROFIT AND
FOR-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS
EVELYN BRODY*
Let me tell you about the rich.
They are different from you and me.
-F. Scott Fitzgerald'
Yes, they have more money.
-Ernest Hemingway2
It is always startling when a distinction long believed to be a
difference of kind turns out to be a difference of degree. Many of our
attitudes, as well as our laws, about charitable enterprise derive from our
belief that nonprofit organizations are "different" from business
organizations. As a result of their unique social value, we grant nonprofit
organizations subsidies that we withhold from proprietary enterprises. For
example, federal income tax law exempts the income earned by nonprofit
hospitals while taxing the income earned from identical procedures
conducted by proprietary hospitals.3
Recent years have brought
increasing criticism of tax and other subsidies extended to the nonprofit
sector.4 But we cannot really understand whether, and which, subsidies
are appropriate until we examine the premise. Thus, this Article raises
the antecedent question: are nonprofits different?
* Assistant Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology, Chicago, Illinois. This work was supported by the Marshall D. Ewell
Research Fund at the Chicago-Kent College of Law, and benefited greatly from
comments made by my colleagues at Chicago-Kent during a faculty round table. I also
thank Lori Andrews, Avner Ben-Ner, Lloyd Cohen, Stuart Deutsch, Rick Hasen, Harold
Krent, Gregory Mark, William Randolph, Jack Siegel, and Dennis Young.
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(1945) (notebook entry of

"Ernest's wisecrack").
3. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1994).
4. See, e.g., John D. Colombo, Why Is HarvardTax Exempt? (And Other Mysteries

of Tax Exemption for Private EducationalInstitutions), 35 ARiz. L. REV. 841 (1993).
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This question can be explored from a variety of perspectives-legal,
economic, historical, political, psychological, religious, and sociological.5
One might expect the economic account to be the simplest, and least
controversial. Surprisingly, however, the accepted economic account of
organizational form explains very little about the differences between
nonprofits and for-profits. In many ways, all firms, nonprofit and forprofit, bear more resemblance to each other than their organizational
differences suggest. Because all firms operate through people, firms arise
and behave similarly in response to economic forces. These economic
issues are so rich that they merit independent study.
Even a casual observer knows that a proprietary business has
"owners" and a nonprofit does not. Indeed, the economics literature rests
its conception of the nonprofit sector on the centuries-old rule, imposed
by law, 6 that forbids a charity from distributing profits to owners.
Indelibly named fifteen years ago by economist and law professor Henry
Hansmann,7 this "nondistribution constraint"8 constitutes, to its admirers,
5. See generally Evelyn Brody, Institutional Dissonance in the Nonprofit Sector
(Mar. 10, 1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the New York Law School Law
Review) (exploring whether nonprofits are different than for-profit entities from some
of these various perspectives).
6. The Statute of Charitable Uses, 43 Eliz., ch. 4 (1601), representsthe first English
attempt to enforce this common-law rule by legislation.
7. Henry Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 838
(1980) [hereinafter Hansmann, Role of Nonprofit Enterprise].

8. ProfessorHansmann describes nonprofits and the nondistribution constraint in this
way:
A nonprofit organization is, in essence, an organization that is barred
from distributing its net earnings, if any, to individuals who exercise control
over it, such as members, officers, directors, or trustees. By "net earnings"
I mean here pure profits-that is, earnings in excess of the amount needed to
pay for services rendered to their organization; in general, a nonprofit is free
to pay reasonable compensation to any person for labor or capital that he
provides whether or not that person exercises some control over the
organization. It should be noted that a nonprofit organization is not barred
from earning a profit. .

.

.It is only the distribution of the profits that is

prohibited....
Most nonprofits of any significance are incorporated. For these
organizations, the nondistribution constraint is imposed, either explicitly or
implicitly, as a condition under which the organization receives its corporate
charter....

In the corporation law of some states, the nondistribution constraint is
accompanied or replaced by a simple statement to the effect that the
organization must not be formed or operated for the purpose of pecuniary gain.
Id. at 838-39; see also CAL. CORP. CODE § 5410 (West 1991 & Supp.) ("No corporation
shall make any distribution."); N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 102(a)(5)
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the elixir of life for the nonprofit sector. According to this school, the
constraint against distributing profits both explains the existence of the
nonprofit sector and keeps it honest, ensuring the dedication of assets and
Professor Hansmann's
effort towards performing good deeds.9
compelling construct has even caught the attention of the United States
Supreme Court.' 0
The nondistribution constraint theory, however, is circular. Because
the public cannot judge quality, the theory posits," the public creates
(McKinney 1970) ("'Corporation' or 'domestic corporation' means a corporation...
(2) no part of the assets, income or profit of which is distributable to, or inures to the
benefit of, its members, directors or officers except to the extent permitted under this
statute."); REv. MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 13.01 (1987).
9. See Hansmann, Role of Nonprofit Enterprise,supra note 7, at 835-45; Henry
Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit CorporationLaw, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 497, 504-09
(1981) [hereinafter Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit CorporationLaw].
10. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 675 n.6 (1990)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (citations to Hansmann omitted):
The leading theory of nonprofit enterprises holds that the rationale for use of
the nonprofit form lies chiefly in the so-called "non-distribution constraint."
. . . The nondistribution constraint helps overcome contractual failure in
situations where the activities of the corporation are difficult to monitor, by
removing the "profit motive" and assuring those who contribute to, and
contract with, the corporation that the nonprofit's managers will not exploit
informational deficiencies to pursue their own private interests. Hence,
Jlustice] K[ennedy]'s proposed reliance on a nonprofit's donors to monitor and
police the corporation's activities overlooks the raison d'itre of the nonprofit
form.
11. Professor Hansmann describes three situations in which the public or the patron
of a firm would prefer to deal with a nonprofit: first, third-party payers, like persons
making donations to the American Red Cross for disaster relief; second, public goods,
like public monuments or scientific research; and, third, complex personal services, like
hospital care or education. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit CorporationLaw, supra
note 9, at 504-09. In each of these cases Hansmann sees an information asymmetry
because the payor/donor cannot effectively judge the quality of the output of various
services. In the first example, the donor will probably be unable to determine if the
money is actually being spent on disaster relief because that relief could be offered far
from the donor, say in a foreign country. Id. at 505. In the second example, the donor
may be tempted not to make a donation at all and instead "free-ride" on the other
contributions, because the eventual output will be a "public good"; in addition, donors
will need assurances that their money is being used for the purposes (scientific research,
public monument) for which the donor gave. Id. at 505-06. In the third example, the
patient in a hospital may not know, because of lack of expertise, what quality or type of
care is appropriate. Id. at 506.
In each of these examples, Hansmann argues, the nondistribution constraint solves
the information asymmetry by creating a bond of trustworthiness between the nonprofit
firm and the patron; the money spent by a nonprofit will be spent for a particular
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nonprofits whose output quality cannot be judged. Worse, if the public
simply looks to nonprofit status as a signal of trustworthiness, creating this
legal form of organization bestows a "halo" on any nonprofit organization
regardless of merit. Finally, even if the nondistribution constraint ensures
that the sector is worthy, how does it help the public choose between
competing nonprofits?
The more we examine the protean nondistribution constraint, the less
it appears capable of explaining how a nonprofit organization does
"good"-much less "better." At the same time, as we compare nonprofit
organizations with their unabashedly profit-distributing proprietary
cousins, we discover that business firms exhibit many of the traits of a
firm without shareholders. Firms in both sectors look a great deal alike
because both the nondistribution constraint in the nonprofit sector and the
theory of profit-maximization in the proprietary sector often fail to deliver
on their promises."2
Running throughout this article is the economic theme of the
"principal-agent problem": Who decides to form a firm as either forprofit or nonprofit, and decides what its goals are? Who decides how the
entity operates? To whom is the firm accountable? Decisional authority
travels throughout the network of relationships that constitute the firm and
its environment. In theory, at the goal-setting level, business firms are
profit-maximizers while nonprofits maximize either quality or quantity of
output. But in practice, because of internal and external constraints,
business corporations are less purely profit-driven than we think, and
working for a nonprofit corporation is more like any other job. Various
economic forces-like resource dependency, institutional isomorphism, and
organizational slack-mold nonprofits and for-profits into similar
configurations with similar problems.
My economic account might appear to be a story without a heart.
What about the vast numbers of people who donate time and money to
nonprofit organizations because they believe in serving society? To
question the economic uniqueness of the nonprofit form, however, is not
to slight the valuable services provided in the nonprofit sector and the
altruism expressed by many affiliated with it."3 Rather, I examine the
extent to which the organizational legal form-nonprofit with a
nondistribution constraint-affects motivations and operations. After all,
purpose, and not converted to personal gain. Id.
12. The paradox of profit seeking is described by Louis Putterman: "[W]hereasthe
existence of a residual claimant and holder of alienation rights is regarded as the best

guarantor of efficient resource use where conventional goods are concerned, it is the
absence of such an agent that is called for [in the case of trust goods]." Louis
Putterman, Ownership and the Nature of the Firm, 17 J. COMP. ECON. 243,256 (1993).
13. See Brody, supra note 5.
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someone who desires, say, to care for young children could work in a
proprietary day-care center as well as in a nonprofit (or, indeed,
governmental) day-care center. For such a person, the nondistribution
constraint might be a constraint but it would not be a binding constraint.
In the end, the same economic force motivates nonprofit firms as forprofit firms: the desire for a reputation as a worthy recipient of future
trade, be it donations, purchase of services, government contracts, or
labor. Each of the nonprofit's constituents has its own goals, which can
be furthered either by exercising "voice" (imposing conditions on the
donation or contract) or "exit" rights (withholding future donations or
dealings). Similar sources of resource dependency can be found in the
for-profit sector: shareholders, customers, and workers have their own
"voice" and "exit" rights. Accordingly, this Article also examines
whether the resources unique to the nonprofit sector-donors of money
and time-can be relied on to ensure greater accountability. However,
"accountability" is a double-edged sword: whether society wants to
privilege donors with shareholder-like control is a normative question.
This Article consists of four parts. Part I provides an overview of the
nondistribution constraint, and summarizes its inherent problems and
limitations: From an economic perspective, the nondistribution constraint
does not effectively distinguish between a nonprofit and its for-profit
counterpart or between one nonprofit and another. Parts II, III, and IV
set forth a description of the three major forces that lead to organizational
conformity and the convergence of the proprietary and the nonprofit
sectors. Part II examines why firms form: a "demand-side" approach
looks at who wants to deal with firms, and a "supply-side" approach
compares the economic motivations and constraints faced by founders of
firms. Part III peers inside the "black box" of the firm, comparing
proprietary and nonprofit management. Finally, Part IV examines how
firms adapt to dependency on key constituents both inside and outside the
organization. This part also considers whether donors and volunteers
provide increased nonprofit accountability. Here, however, we recall that
the nonprofit sector as a whole derives less than one-third of its revenue
from donations, and few nonprofits depend on a single or small number
of donors. Thus, the relationship between non-profits and their donors
again resembles the relationship between large for-profits and their
shareholders. Given the general economic convergence of the two sectors,
the Article concludes by suggesting that unless nonprofits can more
sharply distinguish themselves from for-profits on other grounds, society
might prefer to subsidize charitable and other social outputs produced by
all organizations rather than subsidize nonprofits based on their
organizational form.
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I. OVERVIEW
To economists beginning with Ronald Coase in 1937,14 all firms
(nonprofit, proprietary, or even governmental) exist to solve the problem
that has come to be called "transaction costs." Think of the "make or
buy" dilemma. If, for example, a newspaper publisher can cheaply and
reliably contract with paper suppliers, the publisher will simply buy this
input; but if the demand for paper fluctuates wildly, and the publisher and
suppliers cannot draft a contract that will anticipate all possible
opportunistic behavior by each other, the publisher might be better off
buying a paper producer.' 5 When contracts fail, firms form.
To transaction-cost economists, nonprofit firms similarly solve a
"contract failure." Professor Hansmann argues that the existence of
nonprofits stems from information asymmetry between the charity and the
patron. That patron might be a donor, making a gift to aid a beneficiary
the donor never sees;' 6 alternatively, due to lack of expertise, the patron
might be a client, such as a hospital patient, who cannot judge the quality
of services provided."7 The nonprofit organization delivers these "trust
goods," the production of which the donor or patron cannot monitor. 8
Without the nondistribution constraint ensuring, in theory, that the assets
will be used for a particular charitable purpose and not converted to
personal gain, these important trust goods might never be supplied.
Although using a firm instead of contracts solves one problem, it
creates another. We are still dealing with the world of real people. Once
we interpose a nonprofit firm between the patron and the beneficiary, we
enter the realm of the "principal-agent problem." Agency costs are the
heart of the maxim: "If you want something done right, you have to do
it yourself." To an economist, agency costs arise because the agent
simply does not have the same incentives as the principal. Agency costs
include, among other things, the principal's costs of monitoring the agent
(against misunderstanding, shirking, and even theft), and the agent's cost
14. Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, reprinted in R.H. COASE, TIHE FIRM,
THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 33 (1988).
15. See generally OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF
CAPITALISM (1985) [hereinafter WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS] (particularly
chapters 4 and 5 on vertical integration).

16. Hansmann, Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 7, at 846-47.
17. Id. at 866; see also Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit CorporationLaw, supra
note 9; Henry Hansmann, Economic Theories of Nonprofit Organization [hereinafter
Hansmann, Economic Theories of Nonprofit Organization], in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR:
A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 27 (Walter W. Powell ed., 1987) [this collection hereinafter
cited as THE NONPROFIT SECTOR]; supra note 11; discussion infra part II.
18. See BURTON A. WEISBROD, THE NONPROFIT ECONOMY 60 (1988).
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the promised
of bonding (such
9 as accepting low initial wages to back up
performance).
To Professor Hansmann, the nondistribution constraint solves the
principal-agent problem as well. Under his theory, the promise not to
distribute profits functions as a "bond" to the public that the charity is
more trustworthy than a proprietary enterprise in meeting the needs of
donors or in providing clients with services whose quality cannot be
judged.' Moreover, this bond substitutes for the monitoring that would
otherwise have to be done by donor or client, thus avoiding additional
monitoring costs or even the risk that charitable activity could not be
carried out at all.
While the theory is initially compelling, the nondistribution constraint
cannot carry this much weight. "Trustworthiness" is a device that people
adopt in the face of uncertainty, but the question of uncertainty in the
The nondistribution
nonprofit firm is actually quite complicated.
constraint cannot alone create trust; after all, the public sector also
functions under a nondistribution constraint, but many people do not trust
the government to use its resources wisely.
First, there might be information uncertainty on both sides. Just as
the patron may be unable to judge the quality of a particular service
provided by the nonprofit, the nonprofit itself may not be able to make
accurate judgments about the quality of services it is providing. For
example, neither a hospital patient nor the hospital might know the best
action to take, particularly when balancing (or trading off) quality and
costs (although, of course, the hospital likely knows more than the
patient).2'
Second, in a case of information asymmetry, trust cannot alone solve
the firm's internal agency costs. Even assuming the hospital knows the
optimal care to provide, how does the hospital solve the principal-agent
problem with its own employees? What ensures that the hospital
effectively monitors its employees? While the nondistribution constraint
may bar direct payments to insiders, it does not suffice to ensure that the
charity will spend its money in any particular way. The nondistribution
constraint is a negative constraint: it tells the nonprofit what it cannot do
with its resources, rather than what it must do with them.
19. See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
ManagerialBehavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305

(1976).
20. See supra note 11.
21. A nonprofit hospital is a peculiar case to illustrate the trustworthiness of the
nonprofit sector; after all, the patron's broker into the hospital, and the person who
determines most of the patient's care, is the doctor, who is usually a self-employed,
proprietary agent.
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Indeed, while the nondistribution constraint might convince the patron

that the nonprofit is more trustworthy than a for-profit in situations of
opportunistic behavior, the nonprofit could be even less trustworthy than

proprietary entities in avoiding inefficient expenditures.

The costs of

nonprofit trustworthiness might be higher than the profits a proprietary
enterprise would generate and distribute to its owners. In these situations,
the nondistribution constraint is not only unnecessary but wasteful.
We are beginning to see tensions between organizational constraints
and efficiency tools in traditional nonprofit industries where proprietary
enterprises have entered. For example, proprietary hospitals sometimes
base compensation on the profits of the enterprise, both to best motivate
workers and to preserve the enterprise from undue risk.' Profits-based
compensation, of course, expressly violates the nondistribution

constraint?2'
Finally, and perhaps of most practical importance, assuming the
nondistribution constraint can explain why the nonprofit sector as a whole
should be more trustworthy, it cannot explain how individual nonprofits
differentiate themselves, and how the public should choose between

competing nonprofits. Increasingly, the services provided by nonprofits

are brokered by intermediaries (such as insurance companies and HMOs)
or the government (such as Medicare and Medicaid).24 While individual
22. See Mark A. Hall, Institutional Control of Physician Behavior: Legal Barriers
to Health Care Cost Containment, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 431, 486-88 (1988) (discussing
hospital efficiency bonus plans).
23. Nonprofits are pushing this restriction. Consider the incentive compensation
plan adopted by a nonprofit trade association, whose "board members had successfully
used incentive compensation in their businesses." Toby Mack, Putting Incentive
Compensation to Work, Ass'N MGMT., Dec. 1993, at 38, 38. Mack describes their
motives in decidedly equity-like terms: "[O]ne of the underlying premises of our plan is
that when times are good, the people who make it happen share the goodies. In leaner
times, we all share the pain. It's part of being a stakeholder." Id. at 44, 103. While
an association might appear to produce nonquantifiable services, this organization
depended on the sale of products, programs, and business services for over two-thirds
of its revenue. Id. at 40. Incentive compensation could thus be based on growth in
membership, gross revenue (from membership, conventions and publication sales), and
net income (from the foregoing, plus cost savings from budget). Id. at 43. The
organization took particular care to set reasonable projections: "If leadership suspects that
budget targets were set low to produce higher incentive payouts, the trust on which
elected leadership accepts the incentive compensation program for staff will be broken."
Id.
24. See, e.g., Paul A. Pautler & Michael G. Vita, Hospital Market Structure,
Hospital Competition, and Consumer Welfare: What Can the Evidence Tell Us?, 10 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 117, 164 (1994) (discussing the brokering of services
by preferred provider organizations); Theodore N. McDowell, Comment, The Medicare-
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clients might lack information and the incentive to investigate providers,
these intermediaries do not. Perhaps the proper nonprofit role should be
information monitoring-that is, monitoring the quality of a for-profit firm
rather than directly providing traditional "nonprofit" services. 25
Instead of searching for a "trustworthy" organizational form, we can
ask the more complex question, "To whom is the nonprofit accountable?"
In a business firm, "accountability" is the mechanism by which the
corporate board and management (the "agents") answer to the
Accountability also exists in
shareholders (the "principals").'
nonbusiness principal-agent relationships: for example, politicians answer
to the electorate. In the nonprofit sector, however, accountability raises
difficult questions because, despite the hypothesis of Professor Hansmann
and others, in most nonprofits there is no clear category of principals.
Under law, the nonprofit firm is not the agent of a particular donor or
As a result, most state nonprofit laws, perhaps
client or beneficiary.
without intending to, create agents without principals.
To some degree accountability is a normative issue, whose resolution
depends on one's view of the proper role of the nonprofit sector in society
and the extent to which it should be left alone. If we accept the nonprofit
sector as "private," as it is under law, then does accountability simply
become a function of answering to whoever holds the purse? And if no
MedicaidAnti-Fraud System, 36 EMORY L.J. 691, 707 (1987) (discussing the brokering

of services by health maintenance organizations).
25. Even the proprietary sector uses devices to overcome information asymmetry
and build "trust," such as name brands, warranties, reputation, and, most recently, ISO

registration. See, e.g., GREG HUTCHINS, THE ISO 9000 IMPLEMENTATION MANUAL
(1994) (stating that to assure customers of quality, companies can voluntarily register for
third-party certification based on uniform standards promulgated by the International
Organization for Standards).
26. I use the terms "principal" and "agent" in their economic senses. Legally, the
directors are agents of the corporation. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 14C (1957).
27. New York nonprofit corporation law provides that a charitable corporation holds

full ownership rights in donated property and is not deemed a trustee. See N.Y. NOTFoR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 513(a) (McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1996) ("[A] corporation
shall hold full ownership rights in any assets... that may be given, granted, bequeathed

or devised to or otherwise vested in such corporation ... and shall not be deemed a
trustee of an express trust of such assets."). However, if a gift is earmarked for a
specific purpose, the governing board of the charitable corporation is obligated to use the

gift for that purpose. See id. § 513(b). California law provides that a charitable
corporation holds its assets in trust for the express purposes enumerated in the
corporation's articles of incorporation. See Queen of Angels Hosp. v. Younger, 66 Cal.

App. 3d 359, 365 (1977). However, if a donor expressly declares a contribution for a
specific purpose, the corporation is obligated to follow that specific purpose. Id.
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major donors exist, as is commonly the case, is the nonprofit accountable
to no one?
As a legal matter, of course, nonprofit organizations are not "owned."
However, economic theory fragments ownership into three characteristics:
the right to profits, the right to control and utilize assets, and the right to
alienate.' A firm that cannot distribute profits is not the same thing as
a firm without profits. Moreover, a firm without shareholders is not a
firm without controllers. Finally, the "absence of alienable residual
claims in nonprofits does not mean that residual risk is not borne."2 9
Because no individual may claim a n6nprofit's surplus, nor can anyone
sell interests in a nonprofit, control over nonprofit assets and operations
becomes the strongest rights that exist in such an organization.
Just as it does for business corporations, the law grants plenary
authority to the nonprofit board of directors to manage the affairs of a
nonprofit corporation. Those who govern a nonprofit firm can exercise
discretion to maximize different goals.
Because of the presumed
information asymmetry between the nonprofit and the patrons, the
nondistribution constraint alone cannot assure the patron that his donation
(or fee) will achieve his intent. If the public cannot tell what is happening
inside the nonprofit, the patron cannot know whether the nonprofit is using
his or her money to maximize the quality of the charity's services, to
reduce their cost to the public, to augment pecuniary and nonpecuniary
compensation of the charity's workers, or even to save for the benefit of
future patrons.30
It would then seem that, as a legal matter, control carried out without
the oversight of shareholders produces a board of directors fundamentally
different from the board of a for-profit corporation. In an attempt to
substitute for the absent shareholders, the law, somewhat awkwardly, still
imposes the fiduciary duties of loyalty and care on nonprofit boards. But
because of the lack of classes of private persons with standing to sue,3
28. See, e.g., Putterman, supranote 12, at 245; see also Armen Alchian & Harold
Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON.

REV. 777 (1972).
29. Eugene F. Fama & Michael C.Jensen, Agency ProblemsandResidual Claims,
26 J.L. & ECON. 327, 342 (1983) [hereinafter Fama & Jensen, Agency Problems].
30. Professor Hansmann recognizes that the nondistribution constraint must be
enforced in order to be effective, Hansmann, Role of Nonprofit Enterprise,supra note

7, at 873-76, but he does not focus on the larger misspending and waste that can occur
without rising to the level of profit distribution.
31. See Mary G. Blasko et al., Standing to Sue in the CharitableSector, 28 U.S.F.
L. REv. 37 (1993).
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in many ways this fiduciary duty is really a legal obligation without a legal
sanction.3 2
Ironically, though, the situation is little better on the proprietary side.
The "separation of ownership and control" in large business corporations
leads to their own "principal-agent problem"-how the shareholders (the
principals) can ensure that the board members (the agents) act in their
interests. Granted, business boards are subject to additional disciplines,
such as stock markets that continuously value corporate performance.
Nevertheless, the striking legal difference between the for-profit model
and the nonprofit model would be more apparent than real if, in
practicality, the nonprofits' untethered, self-perpetuating board structure
were not unique to the nonprofit sector. In reality, because shareholders
usually elect directors from a slate nominated by the current directors, the
board of a publicly held corporation faces much the same replication
imperative as a self-perpetuating nonprofit board.
Once we peer into the black box of the firm, nonprofit or proprietary,
we find a second "principal-agent problem"-the relationship between the
board and its officers.33 By law, in both types of corporations, the board
of directors controls the organization by setting policy for the officers who
conduct the day-to-day management. But board members in both types of
corporations are part-timers, often volunteers, serving for a variety of
altruistic, social, and even selfish reasons, and are not likely to be
technically skilled in the "business" of the enterprise. 34 In contrast to
board members, many chief executive officers, in both types of
corporations, are often more energetic, dominating, "true believers," and
technically proficient.
From reading the newspapers, one could almost model a "hubristic
cost" to nonprofit operations. When a charismatic charitable leader
32. As Henry Hansmann observed: "Although the prohibition on distribution of
profits is more or less clearly embodied in the nonprofit corporation law of nearly all the

states, most states in fact make little or no effort to enforce this prohibition."
Hansmann, Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 7, at 873.
BOORAD, THE ROLE

See also HARRIET

OF STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL IN RELATION TO TROUBLED

12 (Yale Univ. Program on Nonprofit Organizations Working Paper No.
206, Aug. 1994); Office of the Ohio Attorney General, The Status of State Regulation
of Charitable Trusts, Foundation, and Solicitations, 5 COMM'N ON PRIVATE
NONPROFITS

PHILANTHROPY AND PUBLIC NEEDS, RESEARCH PAPERS 2705 (U.S. Treas. Dep't 1977).

Perceiving weak state enforcement, some call for increased IRS action on tax-exempt
organizations, and tighter rules to reach more (and more broadly defined) cases of insider
benefit. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, The Efficiency of the CharitableDollar: An
Unfulfilled State Responsibility, 73 HARV. L. REV.433 (1960).
33. Succeeding agency problems run all the way down the corporate hierarchy.
34. I am speaking here of the "outside" directors, that is, those who are not also

officers of the organization.
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stumbles, the shockwave can topple the charity and ripple throughout the36
nonprofit sector.35 The public thrills to the downfall of Jim Bakker,
Jimmy Swaggart, 37 Covenant House's Father Ritter,38 and United Way

director William Aramony. 9 However, we also find that in the business

sector "the typical chief executive has long seen himself as John Wayne
in a suit: macho, visionary, and totally in control."' And it is not just
company founders, such as the legendary Henry Ford. 4 ' In practice, the
power relationship between a business chief executive and the board of

directors often matches that seen in a nonprofit organization.

Indeed,

economists and management scholars have long recognized that the top

officers of business corporations in practice often control the selection of
board nominees, much as we find in the nonprofit sector.
While the press focuses on the most notorious examples of nonprofit

leaders actually raiding the till, many more subtle forms of "rent seeking"

occur, all perfectly legal (if undesirable). In the end, as Melvin Eisenberg
observes of the business sector, "it may well be that the most important

contemporary problem concerning managerial accountability is not the
manager who consciously violates his trust, but the manager who does his
best but whose best is not good enough."42 What factors operate as a

check when nonprofit management is incompetent, lazy, or socially

wasteful?
Managers, whether nonprofit or proprietary, actually control a very
small portion of their firm's environment. a3 "Resource dependency"'
35. See generally Brody, supra note 5 (discussing the public's expectations for a
"pure" nonprofit sector, despite the real pressures operating on nonprofits).
36. See FormerLeader of PTL Ministry Is Found Liable for $130 Million, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 15, 1990, § 1, at 12 (discussing the fraud case against Jim Bakker, the
former head of the PTL Ministry).
37. See Peter Applebome, Swaggart'sTroublesShow Tension of PassionandPower
in TV Evangelism, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1988, § 1, at 30.
38. Rayna Skolnik, Rebuilding Trust: Nonprofits Act to Boost Reputations, PUB.
REL. J., Sept. 1993, at 29, 31-32.
39. See David Shenk, BoardStiffs: How William Gates and PaulTagliabue Helped
William Aramony Bilk America, WASH. MONTHLY, May 1992, at 9.
40. Matthew Bishop, A Survey of Corporate Governance, ECONOMIST, Jan. 29,
1994, at 13, 14 (specially paginated section appearing after page 58).
41. See Dodge v. Ford Motors, 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919) (describing the
unsuccessful attempt by minority shareholders of Ford Motors to reverse Henry Ford's
decision to spend corporate funds as he determined).
42. Melvin A. Eisenberg, NewModes ofDiscoursein the CorporateLawLiterature,
52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 582, 590 (1984).
43. See generally JEFFREY PFEFFER & GERALD R. SALANCIK, THE EXTERNAL
CONTROL OF ORGANIZATIONS: A RESOURCE DEPENDENCE PERSPECTIVE (1978).
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affects both the policy and operations of the nonprofit. Nonprofits in the
same field compete for directors, donations, government contracts/grants,
employees, volunteers, and clientele.4' Nonprofits protect their turf and
Nonprofits, on
lobby for greater autonomy and less regulation.'
occasion, sell their name to the highest corporate bidder.47
"Organizations compete not just for resources and customers, but for
political power and institutional legitimacy, for social as well as economic
fitness."48 Nonprofits, in short, struggle to survive and to gratify their
goals, just like every other organization.49

Similarly, business corporations must attract resources, such as
employees, suppliers, creditors, government contracts, and customers.

Thus, market competition among nonprofits for these factors of production
and demand should help weed out the performing nonprofits from the
nonperformers. But if efficient use of these constituents is the standard
we apply in holding the nonprofit accountable, then why are business

corporations also not accountable to them, rather than accountable only to
their shareholders?
44. Resource dependency refers to external constraints upon an organization, such
as elements relating to input suptilies and distribution channels, which an organization
will attempt to manage or control. See PFEFFER & SALANCIK, supra note 43; Henry N.
Butler & Barry D. Baysinger, Vertical Restraints of Trade as ContractualIntegration:
A Synthesis of Relational Contracting Theory, Transaction-Cost Economics, and
OrganizationalTheory, 32 EMORY L.J. 1009, 1046-47 (1983).
45. See, e.g., WEISBROD, supra note 18, at 3-4. Professor Weisbrod first collected
his nonprofit ideas in THE VOLUNTARY NONPROFIT SECTOR (1977). See also John A.

Byrne, Profitingfrom the Nonprofits, Bus. WK., Mar. 26, 1990, at 66, 67 (cover story)
(noting "increasing competition from a new generation of social entrepreneurs attacking
such problems as AIDS, Alzheimer's disease, child abuse, and drunk driving").
46. See generallyJ.Craig Jenkins, Nonprofit Organizationsand Policy Advocacy,
in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, supra note 17, at 296.
47. See, e.g., Maria Mallory, The Cola Wars Go to College, Bus. WK., Sept. 19,
1994, at 42, 42 (discussing the $10 million, 10-year contract giving the Coca-Cola
Company exclusive rights to the soft-drink market on Rutgers University campuses; a
$14 million, 10-year pact between the Pennsylvania State University and Pepsi-Co started
the trend in 1992).
48. Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in OrganizationalFields (1983) [hereinafter
DiMaggio & Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited], reprintedin THE NEW INsTITUTIONALISM
IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS at 63, 66 (Walter W. Powell & Paul J.DiMaggio eds.,

1991) [this collection hereinafter cited as THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM].
49. See generally Richard Steinberg, Nonprofit Organizationsand the Market, in
THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, supra note 17, at 118, 118; see also HOWARD E. ALDRICH,
ORGANIZATIONS AND ENvIRONMENTS 265 (1979) ("The major factors that organizations

must take account of in their environments are other organizations.").
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We thus should ask whether the resources unique to the nonprofit
sector-those people who donate money and time-can and do substitute
for the equity holders in a business corporation. First, perhaps surprising
to the modem reader, few nonprofits actually rely on donations for the
bulk of their support: for the nonprofit sector as a whole, just over onefourth of gross receipts come from cash donations." In many cases, no
donor or group of donors effectively influences nonprofit policy. At the
other extreme, in nonprofits where donations dominate, privileging donors
with accountability rights loops back into another market failure, the
"separation of supply from demand"-if by "demand" we mean the
beneficiary's demand rather than the donor's. A nonprofit organization
dependent on a concentrated or organized donor base might be forced to
make poor choices. In a business corporation, shareholders presumably
want one thing-money. If the public's taste turns to other products, the
business sector will shift production. In contrast, the nonprofit sector, can
behave more paternalistically and conservatively. Because donors often
do not consume the services they donate, donor control can lead to
inefficient overproduction of what particular donors want to support. 51
In the end, we find that while the nondistribution constraint imposed
by nonprofit law weakly substitutes for the absent shareholders, for-profit
firms themselves are often weakly accountable to their shareholders. The
principal-agent analysis reveals that proprietary firms cannot perfectly
carry out the desires of the firm's "principals." Because of the control
50. In 1989, private contributions (totalling $111 billion) accounted for 27.2% of
total receipts of the nonprofit sector (up from' 26.2% in 1982). VIRGINIA ANN
HODGKINSON ET AL., NONPROFIT ALMANAC 1992-93: DIMENSIONS OF THE
INDEPENDENT SECTOR 9 (1992). This average masks enormous variations by subsector:

contributions made up 5.5% of total health services funds (down from 9.7% in 1977);
14.6% in education and research (about the same as 1977); 33.9% in social and legal
services (up from 31.9%); 30.9% in civic, social, and fraternal (up from 28.6%); and
62.5% in arts and culture (down from 65.7%). Id. (While this list omits religious
organizations, presumably that is because they receive nearly all of their support from
contributions; indeed, in 1990, 53.7% of individual contributions went to religion. Id.
at 43.) Compare the $111 billion contribution total in 1989 with the estimated value of
volunteer services in 1989, $170 billion, representing 40% of the total labor in the
sector. Id. at 46-47 & 20 (volunteer time was calculated at the average hourly wage for
nonagricultural employees (plus a value for fringe benefits)-an odd formula, because the
report, at 8, states that the average wage in the nonprofit sector was 74% of the average
wage for all other nonagricultural employees). Volunteers accounted for 15% of labor
in health services organizations; 22% in education; 43% in social services; 62% in civic,
social, and fraternal; 67% in arts and culture; and 74% in religious organizations. See
id. at 8.
51. See, e.g., Lester M. Salamon, Partnersin PublicService: The Scope and Theory
of Government-Nonprofit Relations, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, supra note 17, at 99,

112 (discussing philanthropic paternalism).
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powers granted to corporate management, business firms are less profitmaximizing than the shareholders might wish. As for nonprofit firms, the
law has never privileged donors and patrons with shareholder-like
authority. The very independence of nonprofit managers to further
various goals, however, undercuts the assumed trustworthiness produced
by the nondistribution constraint. As a practical result, business firms and
nonprofit firms converge into similar enterprises, functioning in many
similar ways, and, to a large degree, governed by self-perpetuating
management.
II. FORMATION OF THE FIRM: DEMAND-SIDE
AND SUPPLY-SIDE APPROACHES

To understand whether nonprofits are unique, we first must
understand why nonprofits form. To understand why nonprofits form, we
first must understand why any firms form. Once we see why business
firms and nonprofits form, we can see how for-profit firms differ, if at all,
from nonprofits.
A. Transaction Costs, Agency Costs, and
the Utility Function of the Firm
Economists model human behavior assuming autonomous, rational
actors, guided by their preferences and seeking to maximize their utilities
through market transactions.52 As Ronald Coase demonstrated, property
rights can be allocated by the law to either contracting party and, in the
absence of transaction costs, the parties will bargain for equally efficient
uses.' A frictionless market does not, however, exist in the real world.
In the last several decades, economists have focused on the difficulties that
actors face while engaging in transactions.
"Transaction costs" have many components. Information and search
costs include the costs of acquiring information.'
Opportunistic
behavior (the possibility that the person with whom you are transacting
will cheat you)55 requires extensive supervision, or "monitoring costs."
52. See Ronald Jepperson, Institutions,InstitutionalEffects, and Institutionalism,in
THE NEw INSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 48, at 143, 158.
53. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).

54. See George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J.POL. ECON. 213

(1961).
55.
,VILLAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 15, at 47-48 ("By
opportunism I mean self-interest seeking with guile .... [O]pportunism refers to the

incomplete or distorted disclosure of information, especially to calculated efforts to
mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate, or otherwise confuse. It is responsible for real or
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The sad fact that one cannot know everything one needs in order to make
a decision (due to cognitive limitations or "bounded rationality") leads to
taking risks under uncertainty. 6 Also, the costs of contracting and the
result that some worthy activities will simply not be undertaken in the face

of prohibitive transaction costs result in a "deadweight loss" to society.

Economists recognize that institutions 7 reduce uncertainty by
Our
providing dependable frameworks for economic exchange. 8
institutions include economic capitalism and our legal system, both of

which privilege private property and contract. In simple transactions, the
parties can write a contract allocating obligations and rights. In more
complex relationships, however, contracts become unwieldy and,
ultimately, impracticable. The institution of the "firm" is used as a

substitute for a whole network of contracts (formal and informal) between
capitalists, labor, suppliers, customers, and the government (as
regulator). 9 Thus, law-defined organizations, such as partnerships and
contrived conditions of information asymmetry, which vastly complicate problems of
economic organization.").
56. The expression "bounded rationality"-the cognitive assumption that economic
actors try to be rational but can be so only to a limited degree-was coined by Herbert
Simon. See HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF MAN 198 (1957); see also RICHARD M.
CYERT & JAMES G. MARCH, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF THE FIRM (1963); JAMES G.
MARCH & HERBERT A. SIMON, ORGANIZATIONS 169 (1958); WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC

INSTITUTIONS, supra note 15, at 45-46; Armen A. Alchian, Uncertainty,Evolution, and
Economic Theory, 58 J.POL. ECON. 211, 211 (1950) ("[W]here foresight is uncertain,
'profit maximization' is meaninglessas a guide to specifiable action.").
57. As mentioned in the introduction to this Article, Ronald Coase is the father of
institutional economics. Excerpts from many seminal texts, including Coase's 1937 The
Nature of the Firm, have been gathered in THE ECONOMIC NATURE OF THE FIRM: A

READER (Louis Putterman ed., 1986).
58. See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990). On the other hand, "although we stress that rules and

routines bring order and minimize uncertainty, we must add that the creation and
implementation of institutional arrangements are rife with conflict, contradiction, and
ambiguity." Powell & DiMaggio, Introduction to THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM, supra
note 48, at 28; see also Brody, supra note 5.
59. More precisely, even the term "firm" is a simplification. See, e.g., Armen A.
Alchian & Susan Woodward, The Firm is Dead;Long Live the Firm: A Review of Oliver
E. Williamson's The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, 26 J. ECON. LIT. 65, 76 (1988)
("[A] bright line distinguishing 'inside' and 'outside' is missing. . . . [W]e believe a
better and more useful concept is a coalition."). Similarly, we could view a nonprofit
organization as a network of relationships between donors, labor (paid and volunteer),
beneficiaries or clientele, and the government (as both regulator and, sometimes, as
grantor). See generally Thomas S. Ulen, The CoasianFirm in Law and Economics, 18
J. CORP. L. 301 (1993).
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corporations, provide "standard-form" sets of contracts. 60 If I, as an
investor, want to supply a small amount of capital to a real estate venture,
I need not negotiate over contributions, distributions, work, and wages
with every other supplier of equity, labor, and other inputs; rather, I can
just buy stock in the real estate company. But a firm creates its own
costs.
Any principal-agent relationship involves "agency costs": the
monitoring costs by the principal, the bonding costs by the agent, and the
residual loss. 61 To economists, "ownership" includes the various rights
of entitlement to profits, control, and alienation. In all but the smallest
firms, control becomes separated from ownership (think of "passive"
investors). Thus, viewing shareholders as the principals and the firm as
the agent, Michael Jensen and William Meckling identified a type of
agency cost attributable to the costs of the "separation of ownership and
control."62 The economic challenge becomes how to devise ways of
aligning the interests of the manager with the interests of the principal.63
As described below, this is not easy.
1. The Separation of Ownership and Control
What does "ownership" mean in the case of a business corporation?
Obviously, the corporation owns its assets. The shareholders own the
stock. Workers own their labor; suppliers own their supplies; and lessors
(and, in some economic sense, the lenders) own the factory and
equipment. All of these inputs are owned by the separate factors of
production. But it is to the shareholders-and, generally, only to the
shareholders-that the board of directors must account. There is a good
reason for this: Shareholders "are the only voluntary constituency whose
relation with the corporation does not come up for periodic renewal"; and
60. Private institutions designed to reduce transaction costs abound within
organizations; consider, for example, law firm partnerships and schools offering
academic tenure.
61. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 19, at 308. Bonding costs are the costs paid by
the agent to induce the principal to hire the agent. Id. The residual loss is "the dollar
equivalent of the reduction in the principal's welfare" resulting from the "divergence
between the agent's decisions and those decisions which would maximize the welfare of
the principal." Id.
62. Id. at 309.
63. See id. at 323 ("These methods include auditing, formal control systems, budget
restrictions, and the establishment of incentive compensation systems which serve to
more closely identify the manager's interests with those of the outside equity holders.").
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shareholders "are also unique in that their investments are not associated
with particular assets. "64

By law and in theory, at least, the shareholders of a business
corporation elect the members of the board of directors.'

Furthermore,

the shareholders can (again theoretically) replace members of the board
66
simply for misfeasance, or in some states for no reason at all.

However, in reality, shareholders of modern corporations perform very
little monitoring.
It is really only the smaller model of joint enterprise that fits the
statutory paradigm of stockholders who control the board of directors who

oversee management by the officers.

7

In the larger corporations, any

notion of shareholder voice has been discarded, except for large minority
interests.6 8 Rather, as a practical matter, shareholders dissatisfied with
64. Oliver E. Williamson, CorporateGovernance, 93 YALE L.J. 1197, 1210 (1984)
[hereinafter Williamson, Corporate Governance].
65. The business corporation law limits the shareholders' control powers to
extraordinary transactions, such as voting for the board or approving a merger. See,
e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 614(a) (McKinney 1986) (election of board); id. § 903(a)
(McKinney 1986) (approval of merger). In return for giving up day-to-day management
authority, the shareholders are granted liquidity for their investment: if they do not like
how the board is running the company, the shareholders can take the "Wall Street walk"
and sell their shares. Thus, under the proprietary corporation statutes, a great deal of
power vests in the board and the executives. See discussion infra part m.
66. State corporation statutes vary in this regard, with some states permitting
shareholders to remove directors only for cause, while others permit removal with or
without cause. Compare N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 706(a), (b) (McKinney 1986)
(directors may be removed only for cause unless the certificate of incorporation or bylaws provide for removal without cause) with DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k) (1991)
(directors may be removed with or without cause).
67. This description covers the American corporate legal system only. Other
countries look less to a liquid market for shares than to more direct monitoring devices,
such as cross-ownership. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Some Differences in Corporate
Structurein Germany, Japanand the UnitedStates, 102 YALE L.J. 1927 (1993); see also
Bishop, supra note 40, at 15 (specially paginated section appearing after page 58) (In
Japan, "[n]either the board nor the president drives the firm's strategy. That job is left
mainly to middle managers. It is not obvious how accountability can be introduced into
this structure.").
68. Institutional investors, led by such massive public pension funds as CalPERS,
demand, and have succeeded at times in obtaining, more information and seats on the
boards of corporations in which they invest, as well as the ouster of particular executives
they disfavor. After all, due to the sheer size of the pension sector (several trillion
dollars, and mounting) and its limited purpose (to make prudent investments), the "Wall
Street rule" no longer offers a realistic solution to a dissatisfied shareholder-because
pension funds already own much of corporate America, they cannot improve their
positions by selling stock amongst themselves; rather, they have to increase their voice
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the performance of the corporation can only exercise their exit threat by
selling stock.69 The massive publicly traded enterprises, which produce

over half of the country's gross national product, amount to orphans of the
corporate law.

In their famous 1932 book, The Modem Corporation and Private
Property, Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means identified the separation of
ownership and control as the hallmark of the modern publicly held
corporation. 7" Indeed, this very separation "makes possible tremendous

aggregations of property."71

The demand for passive investments'

produces ever increasing concentration of economic power in the hands of

managers of large corporations, limited only by ability of the few to
Who, precisely, are these
effectively manage such large wealth.'
powerful managers? Because corporate law grants the board of directors
authority over the activities of a corporation, "we may say for practical
purposes that control lies in the hands of the individual or group who have
in management. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of
Institutional Investor Voice, 39 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 811 (1992); Salvatore 0. Franco,
Note, Should InstitutionalInvestors Play a Role in Shaping Mexico's Economic Policy?,
16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. (forthcoming spring 1996). But see Bishop, supra
note 40, at 16-17 (specially paginated section appearing after page 58) (the incentives of
public pension funds cause them to be too risk averse; activist funds are the rare
exception). Indeed, CalPERS named a new chief executive, who said "the fund's role
as corporate governance watchdog would become a less adversarial, less public one."
Pension Fund Boss to Rein In Focus, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 24, 1994, § 2, at 3.
69. See MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS
AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 55 (2d ed. 1971), describing the free-rider problem of

shareholder action:
[I]n a large corporation, with thousands of stockholders, any effort the typical
stockholder makes to oust the management will probably be unsuccessful; and
even if the stockholder should be successful, most of the returns in the form
of higher dividends and stock prices will go to the rest of the stockholders.
70. See ADOLPH A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRivATE PROPERTY 4-5 (1932).

71. Id. at 5.
72. Berle and Means also lamented the "spiritual" change in ownership from active
to passive:
It has often been said that the owner of a horse is responsible. If the horse
lives he must feed it. If the horse dies he must bury it. No such responsibility
attaches to a share of stock. The owner is practically powerless through his
own efforts to affect the underlying property.
Id. at 66.
73. Id. at 18.
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the actual power to select the board of directors."'
In the largest
corporations, control is not exercised by a majority of the shareholders;
indeed rarely does a single shareholder own even one percent of the stock
of these corporations. 75
Professors Berle and Means describe the realities of board elections
in a corporation with dispersed ownership, finding that control resides
with those who select the proxy committee (which selects the slate of
board candidates presented to the shareholders). But existing board
members appoint the proxy committee, ensuring that they "can virtually
dictate their own successors." 76 In a corporation with sufficiently
dispersed ownership, "the management can thus become a selfperpetuating body even though its share in the ownership is negligible."'
Modem economists are much less troubled by this separation of
ownership and control.78 When a shareholder buys shares on the stock
exchange, one of the assets she buys is the incumbent management of the
corporation. When the shareholder loses confidence in the management,
she can sell the stock. In the meantime, the stock market signals the value
of the corporation, and of its management.7 9
The ability to transfer ownership of corporate stock, in the view of
some, keeps corporations "honest. " ' The market punishes bad business
judgment by depressing the value of the stock. Indeed, the ability to
control the organization itself has value, and competition for this good
ensures its highest value. 8 In the "market for corporate control," a
74. Id. at 69.
75. See id. at 47-48 (discussing the dispersion of stock ownership).

76. Id. at 87.
77. Id. at 87-88; cf. id. at 88 n.23 ("The nearest approach to [the modem proxy
system for electing proprietary boards] which the present writer has been able to discover
elsewhere is the organization which dominates the Catholic Church. The Pope selects

the Cardinals and the College of Cardinals in turn select the succeeding Pope.").
78. See, e.g., Robert Hessen, The Modern Corporationand Private Property: A
Reappraisal,26 J.L. & ECON. 273, 288 (1983) (arguing that shareholders freely choose

to invest and are therefore not being denied control that they truly expected to exercise).
79. Id. at 288 ("The new shareholders do not want to interfere with [a competent
management system]; on the contrary, they are willing to entrust their savings to it.").
80. See Steven C. Bahls, Resolving Shareholder Dissension: Selection of the
Appropriate Equitable Remedy, 15 J.CoRP. L. 285, 289 (1990) (explaining that the
ability of a shareholder to sell his shares and the potential that the sale will depress the
market value of the stock indirectly ensures qualified management).

81. See Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Marketfor Corporate Control, 73 J.
POL. ECON. 110, 112 (1965).
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buyer might engage in a takeover in order to toss out the bad
managers.Y2 Thus, corporate takeovers serve to focus the minds of those

already in control, and induce them to make the most efficient use of
internal resources. This may be viewed as an indirect requirement of

accountability to shareholders.
Recent legal scholarship about the business sector has raised questions

of corporate responsibility-whether corporations owe obligations that
reach beyond the wealth-maximization of shareholders, to the welfare of

workers, suppliers, creditors, and the local community.A

State

legislatures have expressed these concerns in "corporate constituency

statutes" that permit (or even, in some states, require') the board to

make business decisions taking these other interests into account. 85

Skeptics see corporate constituency laws as thinly disguised anti-takeover
statutes, enacted at the behest of incumbent managers of threatened

corporations. 86 Calling them "hidden-implicit [special-interest] statutes,"

Jonathan Macey views them as "couched in public interest terms to avoid
82. Oliver Williamson credits the emergence in "takeover by tender offer" to the
organizational transformation of large corporations from a "U-form" (unitary form) to
an "M-form" (multidivisional form): "In takeovers, the main advantage of an M-form
firm over a U-form enterprise is the ability of an M-form acquiror to 'digest' its
acquisition." Williamson, CorporateGovernance,supra note 64, at 1225. "Rather than
integrate the acquired assets with the old, the M-form structure separates operating
divisions from a general office in which strategic decision making is centralized; thus,
the corporation can, if desired, divest unwanted divisions or subsidiaries." Id. at 1224-

26.
83. See, e.g., A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS (1992); Comm. on Corp. Laws, Other Constituencies Statutes:
PotentialforConfusion, 45 Bus. LAw. 2253 (1990); Eric W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders:
Interpreting Corporate Constituency Statutes, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 14 (1992);
Roberta Romano, Corporate Governancein the Aftermath of the Insurance Crisis, 39
EMORY L.J. 1155 (1990).
84. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-313(e) (West Supp. 1995) (to sunset
January 1, 1997) (requiring directors to consider interests of non-stockholder
constituencies in change-of-control situations); IDAHO CODE §§ 30-1602, 1702 (Supp.
1995) (same rule).
85. Orts, supranote 83, at 16, 73. For a compilation of at least 28 states that have
enacted corporate constituency statutes, see Al Myers, Note, Whom May the Corporation
Serve?-An Argumentfor the ConstitutionalityofNon-Stockholder Constituency Statutes,
39 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 449, 449 n.1 (1994).
86. Roberta Romano, A Guide to Takeovers: Theory, Evidence, and Regulation, 9
YALE J. ON REG. 119 (1992). Under this view, management exhibits the worst form of
the principal-agent problem: managers will even seek legislative protection in an effort
to retain their jobs, thus preventing shareholders from realizing a high market value for
the stock.
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the political fallout associated with blatant special interest statutes."

87

This view finds support in the fact that these corporate constituency
statutes fail to grant standing in court to the newly protected classes. 8
2. The Firm's "Objective Function"

Neoclassical economists ignored principal-agent problems in
maintaining that the purpose of a proprietary firm is to maximize
profits. 89 By contrast, the law (both corporate law and partnership law)
expressly recognizes the principal-agent problem in imposing fiduciary
duties on the agents (the corporate directors and officers, or the managing

partners).'

For example, the duty of loyalty requires the agent to put

the company's interests ahead of her own.9 Nevertheless, the separation

of ownership from control requires a re-evaluation of the firm's assumed
profit-maximizing objective.

As discussed in Part III, below, many

87. JonathanR. Macey, PromotingPublic-RegardingLegislationThrough Statutory
Interpretation:An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 223, 233 (1986).
88. Orts, supra note 83, at 83.
89. Specifically, the rational firm is assumed to maximize profits and operate with
perfect knowledge. CYERT & MARCH, supra note 56, at 8.
90. See, e.g., N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 717 (McKinney 1992) ("A director shall
perform his duties as a director ... in good faith and with that degree of care which an
ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use under similar circumstances.").
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984) (defining the standard of care directors
owe (not to be grossly negligent) under the business judgment rule). Similarly, the law
of trusts imposes duties on trustees. See AUSTIN W. SCoTr & WILLIAM F. FRATCHER,
THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 2.5 (4th ed. 1987).

91. Corporate law does not necessarily attempt to duplicate the terms that the parties
would negotiate if they had perfect foresight. For example, one major feature that
incorporation offers is limited liability for shareholders. Because many voluntary
creditors (such as lenders) can contract around this shareholder protection with security
agreements and personal guarantees, the great burden of limited liability shifts to
involuntary creditors (tort claimants). See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R.
Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation,52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89 (1985). Limited
liability from tort could not have been achieved by private contract between the parties
conducting the activity. On the other hand, some provisions of corporate law impose
mandatory terms on the parties. For example, the law allocates management power to
the board of directors, and gives shareholders the right to elect and remove directors.
See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89
COLUM. L. REv. 1416, 1417 (1989) ("States almost universally forbid perpetual
directorships"); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in
CorporateLaw:An Essay on the JudicialRole, 89 CoLUM. L. REv. 1618 (1989); Jeffrey
N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of CorporateLaw, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1549
(1989). See generallyFRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FIsCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991).
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economists posit that firms, rather than maximizing profits, instead

maximize a utility, such as budget,'
survival.9'

sales,93 "satisfactory profits, " 94

or even long-run
There is a big difference between maximizing profit and maximizing
some utility, such as budget. It goes to the all-important issue of who gets

to play with the money, which is the heart of the principal-agent problem.
A profit represents the fund available at the end of the day to be spent by

the owners of the firm, or at least those with discretion over spending.
A budget represents the fund available to pay the expenses of the firm,
including wages. Thus, for example, one law school dean told me that he
is a profit maximizer, but the faculty is a budget maximizer.
B. Why Do Nonprofits Form?

A nonprofit organization, too, is a firm. Is this firm also solving a
transaction problem?
Consider two hypotheticals.

opera.

The first is about Carmen, who loves

If Carmen lives in a community with 2000 like-minded rich

constituents, she can found a proprietary opera company and charge the
$100 ticket price necessary to cover costs.'
Alternatively, if this
92. Hansmann, Economic Theoriesof Nonprofit Organization,supranote 17, at 37;
Saul Levmore, Irreversibilityand the Law: The Size of Firms and Other Organizations,
18 J.CORP. L. 333, 336 (1993) (explaining that managers of some firms, instead of
maximizing profit, prefer "to extend their control over increasingly large budgets and
activities").
93. WILLIAM J.BAUMOL, BUSINESS BEHAVIOR, VALUE AND GROWTH 45-52 (rev.

ed. 1967) (firms maximize sales subject to a profit constraint).
94. See Herbert A. Simon, A BehavioralModel of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. ECON.
99, 108 (1955) [hereinafter H. Simon, A BehavioralModel] (reasoning that firms can
elect between a tradeoff of a certain level of satisfactory profits and other, perhaps
conflicting, "preferences").
95. CYERT & MARCH, supra note 56, at 9 (citing Kenneth W. Rothschild, Price
Theory and Oligopoly, 42 ECON. J.297 (1947)) (entrepreneurial decisions aim to
maximize the probability that the organization will survive indefinitely).
96. I am not the first person to pick on opera. See, e.g., Ernest van den Haag,
Should the Government Subsidize the Arts?, 10 POL'Y REv. 63, 66 (1979) ("Whatever
the value of opera.., it cannot be said, as it may be said in Italy or Austria, that opera
has contributed to our national cohesion, history, culture, or consciousness-or that it has
any chance of doing so now.").
97. "On a per performance basis, opera is by far the most expensive of the live
performing arts to produce, involving as it does elements of all the others, combined
typically with a lavish hand. Consequently, it is important economically to play to
relatively full houses, so seasons tend to be short." JAMES HEILBRUN & CHARLES M.
GRAY, THE ECONOMICS OF ART AND CULTURE: AN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE 27 (1993).
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constituency has sufficient political power, it can induce the government
to found the opera, and cover (all or part of) the costs through taxation

(forced extraction from the entire community).

Alas, Carmen's

community is not sufficiently populated with either opera lovers willing

to pay $100 a ticket or members of the non-opera-going public willing to
pick up the tab.98 Does Carmen have any hope of hearing operas in her

town?
Our second hypothetical is about Scrooge. He has accumulated vast
wealth, is on his deathbed, and has no relatives. He feels strangely moved
to give away all of his property to charity. He could easily accomplish
this objective by directing Bob Cratchit, on his behalf and at the time of
his death, to transfer Scrooge's assets to the poor. But Scrooge wants
control even after death over the disposition of the assets. (Are you
surprised?) Specifically, he wants his assets invested in a prudent mix of
securities, and the income used each year, in perpetuity, to purchase
turkeys each Christmas to give to the poor. What assurance can we give

Scrooge that his wishes will be faithfully carried out?
The economic analysis of the nonprofit sector adopts a marketoriented approach to explain the existence of nonprofit organizations. 99
Predict these scholars:
[O]pera programming (probably because of the higher cost per production) is
even more conservative than the programming of symphony concerts; very
little is heard that was written later than the beginning of the twentieth century.
... [O]ne cannot be very optimistic about the long-run prospects for opera,
unless new works can be developed that will excite audiences.
Id. at 355 (footnote omitted).
98. In one study, only 3% of adults attended an opera in the last year (8% of those
with income of $50,000 or more), 4% attended a ballet, 12% attended a play, 13% heard
live classical music, 17% saw a musical, and 22% went to an art museum. Of all those
who have ever attended an opera, 13% had income of less than $15,000; 14% earned
between $15,000 and $25,000; 33% earned between $25,000 and $50,000; and 41%
earned more than $50,000 (at a time when this income class represented 15.5% of all
adults). This is the most top-heavy income distribution for all these "high-culture" arts
categories. Dick Netzer, Arts and Culture, in WHO BENEFITS FROM THE NONPROFIT
SECTOR? 174, 183 tbl. 6.2 (Charles T. Clotfelter ed., 1992).
99. Estelle James says that economists try too hard to fashion an argument for the
existence of nonprofits, and for why they are concentrated in certain "key human-service
sectors." Estelle James in Sharon Oster & Estelle James, Comments [hereinafter James,
Comments], in THE ECONOMICS OF NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS: STUDIES IN STRUCTURE
AND POLICY 154, 156 (Susan Rose-Ackerman ed., 1986) [this collection hereinafter cited
as THE ECONOMICS OF NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS]. Rather, Professor James looks to the

historical (empirical) record. She finds that around the world, religious organizations
have been the founders of nonprofit schools (in order to maximize religious adherents,
because "schools are one of the most important institutions of taste formation or
socialization") and hospitals (when people are in urgent need, religious groups can gain
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Both of our hypotheticals are examples of the type of "market failure"
In the absence of a nonprofit sector,
known as "contract failure.""
these theories posit, Carmen could not see her operas and Scrooge would

not endow a charitable trust. The existence of the nonprofit sector, under
these explanations, overcomes the transaction costs between Carmen and
the other opera-goers and between Scrooge and his trustees.
First, let's return to Carmen. Her problem is that she is willing to
more
to see opera than the average person. She is what economist
pay
Burton Weisbrod calls the "undersatisfied demander," because she is
willing to bear a tax that others are not in order to obtain this good.10'
If Carmen can find sufficient opera lovers, they will found an opera

company that charges an affordable $50 a ticket, and the difference in cost
entry). Id. at 155. So why do people patronize religious schools and hospitals?
Professor James suggests that those of the faith seek to perpetuate it; others might trust
religious (as opposed to nonprofit) providers; and volunteer labor might keep the cost
down. Id. at 156; see also JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS,
AND AMERICA'S SCHOOLS 27 (1990) ("About half of all private schools are Catholic, and
the rest are a diverse lot of religious schools, college preparatory schools, military
academies, and schools for children with special problems or talents."). Of course,
where the population is religiously heterogenous, social service coverage provided by
religious nonprofits can fall short of universal. See, e.g., Salamon, supra note 51, at
112 (noting that until the early 1960s, Catholic and Jewish charities provided most child
welfare services in New York City; "[s]ince most of the poor blacks who migrated to the
city in the post-World War II era were Protestants, however, they did not immediately
find a 'home' in the established agency structure."(citation omitted)).
100. As discussed at the end of this subsection, one could alternatively view the
Carmen case as one of government failure. See, e.g., Avner Ben-Ner & Benedetto Gui,
Introduction to THE NONPROFIT SECTOR INTHE MIXED ECONOMY 7 (Avner Ben-Ner &
Benedetto Gui eds., 1993) [this collection hereinafter cited as THE NONPROFIT SECTOR
IN THE MIXED ECONOMY].
101. "When demand is diverse . . . whatever quantities and qualities of services
government provides will oversatisfy some people and undersatisfy others." WEISBROD,
supra note 18, at 25. If "it were possible, and acceptable, for government to
discriminate among consumers, charging each a tax price that left each one satisfied..
. [, so-called] Lindahl prices," the public sector could achieve the same end. Id. at 223
n.32. For an extended, more technical explanation, see Burton A. Weisbrod, Toward
a Theory of the Voluntary Nonprofit Sector in a Three-Sector Economy, in THE
ECONOMICS OF NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS, supra note 99, at 21. See also Todd Sandier
& John T. Tschirhart, The Economic Theory of Clubs: An Evaluative Survey, 18 J.
ECON. LITERATURE 1481 (1980) (reviewing literature addressing the economic theory
and justifications for clubs).
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would be made up by their voluntary donations. In effect, Carmen and
the other contributors would engage in voluntary price discrimination."°
But why does the opera company form as a nonprofit enterprise rather
than as a proprietary one? (In order to focus on the importance of
organizational form, we ignore the likely strong effects of tax
exemption.)' 03
Recall the legal restriction
on nonprofit
organizations-they cannot distribute surplus to their owners. Admittedly,
the notion of profit in an opera company is a bit of a stretch, but think of
other nonprofit enterprises that satisfy private constituents. For example,
private universities and hospitals can, and often do, earn a surplus which
they carry forward. According to Professor Hansmann's theory, this
"nondistribution constraint" is the enterprise's bond that private persons
will appropriate neither the donations nor the ticket purchases made by
Carmen.
Professor Hansmann requires one more feature in his account of the
nonprofit sector-what he calls "information asymmetry." Admittedly
Carmen will see her operas, but she "cannot tell . . . whether her
contribution of fifty dollars in fact purchased a marginal increment of
102. The temptation to free-ride on the donations of others plagues collective action.
See Hansmann, Economic Theories of Nonprofit Organization, supra note 17, at 36
("[T]icket purchasers with unusually high demand for performing arts productions can
simply be asked to contribute some portion of the consumer surplus they would otherwise
enjoy at the nominal ticket price-and, interestingly, a large proportion is in fact willing
to do so."). See generally OLSON, supra note 69. Professor Netzer breaks down the
revenue sources, as of 1985, for several categories of the nonprofit arts and cultural
subsector. Opera's total income came to $305 million, of which $182 million came from
earned income (presumably mostly ticket sales) and $123 million came from donations.
Of these donations, $18 million came from governments (foregone taxes are an
uncounted additional subsidy) and $105 million came from private sources ($13 million
from corporations, $12 million from foundations, and $80 million from individuals).
Netzer, supra note 98, at 178 tbl. 6.1.
103. Commentators debate the influence of tax exemption, but, after all, nonprofit
organizations existed in the United States before the creation of the income tax. (It is
not so much that the opera needs the income-tax exemption-after all, it unlikely operates
at a surplus-but that it can offer tax-deductibility for donations made to it. I.R.C. §§
170, 501(c)(3) (1994). On the other hand, charities have long enjoyed property-tax
exemption, and propertied opera companies probably also seek state and local propertytax exemption. I will be considering these issues in a future article on efficient tax
subsidies. Nor are all modern-day nonprofits automatically federally tax-exempt. Most
recently, in 1986 Congress removed the income tax exemption of the Blue Cross and
Blue Shield plans and other insurance-providing nonprofits, such as certain health
maintenance organizations. I.R.C. § 501(m)(3)(B); see Howard S. Levy, Note, Ronald
J. Thompson v. Midwest Foundation Independent Physicians' Association (ChoiceCare):
The Conversion of NonprofitHealth Maintenance Organizationsto For-ProfitStatus, 16
N. KY. L. REV. 361 (1989).
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corresponding value in the quantity or quality of service."104 Scrooge,
too, does not want his donation siphoned off by the fund managers. This
information asymmetry between principal and agent occurs whenever the
donor is separated from control. Professor Hansmann uses the example
of the donor who sends money to CARE for famine relief overseas.'05

To Professor Hansmann, the nondistribution constraint so binds the fund
06

managers that they might as well spend the money on doing good.
That is, Professor Hansmann does not compare the cost of private
contracting (and monitoring) with the cost of institutionalizing the

nonprofit sector; he believes that there is no way to privately contract for
these services."'7

Thus, to turn Professor Hansmann's theory around,

"nonprofit" enterprises would form even in the absence of a nonprofit law

ifthe proprietary enterprise could privately bind itself to a nondistribution

constraint.'

That is, it is the mandatory nature of the nondistribution

constraint that gives Scrooge the confidence to go forward.

Thus, Professor Hansmann's nondistribution constraint theory purports
to solve two of the three agency costs: the principal's monitoring costs
and the agent's bonding costs. 0 9 (Under these "demand-side" models,
we can view either the donors or the consumers as the principals and the

nonprofit managers as the agents; Professor Hansmann collectively refers
104. Hansmann, Economic Theories of Nonprofit Organization, supra note 17, at
30 (example of a contributor to a listener-sponsored radio station).
105. Id. ("The difficulty is that the purchaser (donor), who has no contact with the
intended beneficiaries, has little or no ability to determine whether the firm performs.
• . it well. In such circumstances, a proprietary firm might well succumb to the
temptation to provide less or worse service than was promised.").
106. Id. ("In situations such as these, the nonprofit organizational form, owing to
the nondistribution constraint, offers the individual some additional assurance that her
payment is in fact being used to provide the services she wishes to purchase.").
107. Theoretically, a proprietary famine-relief corporation could promise not to pay
dividends, and agree to be sued (under a breach of contract theory) if it does. But, as
Prof. Hansmann points out elsewhere, the business-law hoops one would have to jump
through make binding oneself to this promise difficult, if not impossible. Hansmann,
Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, supra note 9, at 517 (pointing out that
shareholders and the board could always later amend the articles of incorporation to
permit dividend distributions). But what if the stock bears a legend stating: "This stock
may not be transferred except to another charity" (or "except to a nonprofit recognized
as tax exempt under Internal Revenue Code section 501(c)(3)," which itself imposes a
nondistribution constraint)?
108. A separate and important question, of course, is the "fit" between assuring the
donor's intent and the nondistribution constraint. That is, is this the right solution to the
principal-agent problem?
109. This leaves only the residual loss, defined supra note 61.
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This demand-side theory also

provides an explanation for when the government will provide the good,
and when it will be left to the private nonprofit sector to do so. After all,
the public sector also is subject to the nondistribution constraint,"' and,
through its power of taxation, can compel all to participate, thus reducing
any free-rider problems.1 2 In a more homogeneous society, with a
uniform demand for the good, the populace will be willing to tax itself to
supply the good."' Our highly mobile population sorts itself into "an
equilibrium in which each municipality provides a bundle of public goods
at a tax price which conforms to the preferences of the median voter."" 4

Sometimes the voters fight not over money but over ideology, such as
whether to offer abortions or restrict access, or whether to permit or

forbid school prayer." 5 In any case, nonprofit organizations offer a
heterogenous alternative to government." 6

110. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit CorporationLaw, supra note 9, at 502-03.
But see Ira M. Eliman, Another Theory of Nonprofit Corporations,80 MICH. L. REV.
999 (1982) (arguing for limiting the nonprofit law to donative nonprofits, and designing
a separate mutual-benefit nonprofit law for paying patrons).
111. WEISBROD, supra note 18, at 223 n.30.
112. On the other hand, Estelle James suggests that it is easier for private nonprofits
to charge fees than for the government to do so, and so it is cheaper for government to
subsidize nonprofits. James, Comments, supra note 99, at 156-57.
113. Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON.
416 (1956) (the seminal article on how the greater homogeneity of lower governments,
when compared with federal or state governments, can satisfy the median "consumervoter"). Indeed, federal income tax exemption is granted to nonprofit organizations
whose purposes include "lessening the burden of government." Treas. Reg. §
1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (1995); see John G. Simon, The Tax Treatment of Nonprofit
Organizations:A Review of Federal and State Policies, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR,
supra note 17, at 67, 76.
114. Roger Friedland & Robert R. Alford, Bringing Society Back In: Symbols,
Practices,and Institutional Contradictions,in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALIsM, supra note
48, at 232, 233 (citations omitted). Social choice theory, beginning with Kenneth
Arrow's "Impossibility Theorem," asserts there is no reasonable way to make collective
decisions. See KENNETH ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (rev. ed.

1963). The argument in the text holds, however, regardless of whether the preferences
of the median voter or those of a particular interest group prevail.
115. James Douglas, Political Theories of Nonprofit Organization, in THE
NONPROFIT SECTOR, supranote 17, at 43, 47 ("The classic pluralist argument is that a
voluntary nonprofit sector permits a greater diversity of social provisions than the state
itself can achieve.").
116. See, e.g., WEISBROD, supra note 18, at 41-42 ("Nonprofits are a potential
safety valve."); cf.James M. Buchanan, An Economic Theory of Clubs, 32 ECONOMICA
1 (1965) (claiming that there is a middle ground to public and private groupings-the
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The public's hunger for a trustworthy supplier does not explain why
nonprofits almost exclusively limit their production to services rather than
also produce goods. 7 While the characteristics of many goods present

no information asymmetry (such as fresh fruit), demand often arises for
tangible "trust goods."

Why are there no nonprofit car dealers?" 8 To

answer this question, we must now shift our focus to the "supply side."
C. Comparing the "Demand" Side to the "Supply" Side
We have just looked at the circumstances in which people demand to
deal with a more "trustworthy" form of enterprise. Now let us look at the

supply side. What's in it for the founder (and other significant players)?
I can think of two explanations for why a founder would renounce profits

ownership-one eleemosynary and the other self-regarding (if not venal).
First, the founder might seek only control of the enterprise, but no

monetary reward. Alternatively (or perhaps as well), is the rent-seeking
opportunity-the founder might believe she can capture the monetary

reward in a form other than that which inures to owners of capital." 9

general theory of clubs).
117. Academics have found that the nonprofit industry operates almost totally in the
service sector. See, e.g., Avner Ben-Ner & Theresa Van Hoomissen, Nonprofit
Organizations in the Mixed Economy, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR IN THE MIXED
ECONOMY, supranote 100, at 27. Professors Ben-Ner and Van Hoomissen further argue
that only nonrival goods (and services) give rise to a nonprofit response. Id. at 34 n.7,
35. But hospital services are not nonrival. After all, one person can get great care and
another poor care. See also Hansmann, Role of Nonprofit Enterprise,supra note 7, at
847 (suggesting that there is less information asymmetry in a consumer goods situation
because the consumer takes delivery of the goods himself, and therefore the extra
trustworthiness that a nonprofit provides is not required).
118. Cf. George A. Akerlof, The Marketfor "Lemons":Quality Uncertaintyand the
Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970) (describing asymmetric information).
Consumer cooperatives develop for frequently purchased goods, like country clubs and
discount clubs. See Hansmann, Economic TheoriesofNonprofit Organization,supranote
17, at 34 ("Like public utilities, and in contrast to nonprofits, [consumer cooperatives]
usually sell only simple standardized goods and hence do not typically seem to arise as
a response to contract failure." (citations omitted)). Under Professors Ben-Ner and Van
Hoomissen's theory, the noncontrolling demand-side stakeholders require that there be
controlling stakeholders who purchase the nonprofit output at the same price. Ben-Ner
& Van Hoomissen, supra note 117, at 48-49. But then by definition a nonprofit
organization must have purchasing controlling stakeholders. How many cars can any one
person buy?
119. Burton Weisbrod calls these nonprofits "for-profit[s] in disguise," and
attributes their existence to lack of enforcement of the nondistribution constraint.
,VEISBROD, supra note 18, at 11. Henry Hansmann similarly decries the poor state
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1. The "Replication Imperative" of the Nonprofit Board
The principal-agent problem gets more complicated, and more
interesting, in the nonprofit world."
Who, if anyone, are the
principals, and what is the relationship among the "agents"? Looking
initially at a nonprofit organization as a firm, a nonprofit organization has
workers and suppliers, and often lessors and lenders. A nonprofit
corporation also has customers (sometimes called clientele or
beneficiaries). And, in addition to its tangible assets, the entity owns a
badge called "nonprofitness," a suggestion of credibility and deservedness
that can translate into monetary value in dealings with the public.
In the business sector, the bundle of rights granted shareholders
includes the right of oversight, and the right to have the board of directors
act in their interests. In those few nonprofits that have a membership who
elect directors, the members perform the oversight function of
shareholders.12 '
But otherwise there is no class analogous to
shareholders because the law does not consider donors to have invested
capital at risk in the same sense that the shareholders have. Most
nonprofits, accordingly, have "self-perpetuating" boards. Moreover, the
statutory substitute for shareholders-the state attorney general-can step
in only in the extreme case of malfeasance."
In the absence of
shareholders, therefore, the law must necessarily be granting additional
enforcement of the nondistribution constraint. See Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit
CorporationLaw, supranote 9, at 507-08, 600-15. My argument goes further, however.
I am concerned not just with "excess payments" (Weisbrod) or private inurement
(Hansmann) or even waste, but also with an enterprise whose returns can be allocated
to reasonable costs of compensation (and other inputs except equity capital). See, e.g.,
A.G. Holtmann & Todd L. Idson, Wage Determination of Registered Nurses in
Proprietaryand Nonprofit Nursing Homes, 28 J.HUM. RESOURCES 55 (1993) (the

demand for higher quality nurses in nonprofit nursing homes, which produce higher
quality services than proprietary nursing homes, explains the higher wages paid to nurses
in nonprofits).

120. Cf. Oliver E. Williamson, Economic Institutions: Spontaneousand Intentional
Governance, 7 J.L., ECON. & ORGANIZATION 159, 181-83 (1991) (special issue)
(discussing "de facto" ownership under socialism).
121. See REv. MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. AcT §§ 1.40(21), 6.03 (1987).
122. However, the American Bar Association's Revised Model Nonprofit

Corporation Act grants standing to the attorney general to protect the public interest.
REV. MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 1.7 (1987); see also Lizabeth A. Moody, The

Who, What, and How of the Revised Model Nonprofit CorporationAct, 16 N. KY. L.
REV. 251, 281 (1988) (The state's broad power of supervision over nonprofits "is one
of the features of the Revised Act that is both most criticized and most complimented.").
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control rights to the directors and other managers of a nonprofit

corporation. 13

The most important task of the nonprofit board is to ensure its own

continuation.

How do self-perpetuating nonprofit boards fulfill their

replication imperative? Take, for example, one of the oldest nonprofit

organizations, the Catholic Church. While the church has perpetual life,
its pope does not. The task of continuing the papacy falls to the College
of Cardinals. And who names cardinals to the college? The pope
currently reigning. 24 The Catholic Church probably comes as close as
humanly possible to organizational parthenogenesis."'z As much true in
123. Cf. CHUBB & MOE, supra note 99, at 32. John Chubb and Terry Moe, in
studying public schools, apply a similar control analysis to the public sector, in trying
to ascertain why schools systems seem so unresponsive to the wishes of parents and
students:
The fundamental point to be made about parents and students is not that they
are politically weak, but that, even in a perfectly functioning democratic
system, the public schools are not meant to be theirs to control and are literally
not supposed to provide them with the kind of education they might want. The
schools are agencies of society as a whole, and everyone has a right to
participate in their governance. Parents and students have a right to participate
too. But they have no right to win. In the end, they have to take what society
gives them.
Id.
124. See, e.g., Pope Appoints 30 New Cardinals:Selections Ensure Conservative
Influencefor Years, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 31, 1994, §1, at 8 ("The College of Cardinals now
numbers 137, but only 98 are 'cardinal electors,' meaning they are younger than 80 and
therefore eligible to vote for a new pope."); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen,
Separationof Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & EcON. 301, 319-20 (1983) [hereinafter
Fama & Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control] (comparing organizational
structure of Catholic Church with those of Protestant and Jewish religions).
125. Even the Catholic church today suffers severe goal conflicts, because of "[t]wo
competing visions of Catholicism: to nail down and to gather up." See Paul Wilkes, The
Popemakers, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 11, 1994, § 6 (Magazine) at 62, 101. The cardinals
know that when they "gather in the Sistine Chapel ... ultimately they will not choose
a program; they will choose a man, and only a man." Id. Wilkes interviewed several
cardinals who might be elected to succeed John Paul II. Joseph Cardinal Bernardin of
Chicago imagined the process of selecting a pope:
[1] would think that a man takes two things into a conclave, only two: his life
and the Holy Spirit. .

.

. He takes his humanity, all his humanity. Yes, we

are celibate males, but we are human beings first. Hopefully compassionate,
sensitive human beings ....

Somehow, some way, the choice will suddenly

seem right. And it will be.
Id. at 84. While Godfried Cardinal Danneels of Belgium envisioned:
Any man who enters the conclave desiring to be pope must either be mad or
unconscious. He should be forced, dragged to the chair of St. Peter. A good
pope should never have thought of himself as a pope in the first place. And
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the nonprofit sector as in the business sector, when people set to the task
of selecting their successors, the successor tends to resemble the
chooser. '"
Nonprofit trusteeship is a highly institutionalized activity, although the

form the institution takes varies with the society that produced it. 27 The
sheer number of nonprofit organizations has exploded; in 1940 there were

about 14,000 nonprofits," but by 1990 there were 1.4 million.'29 All
of these organizations must staff their boards.

As Peter Dobkin Hall

observes, "the dramatically increased number of nonprofits has created an
enormous demand for competent trustees-a demand that far exceeds the
population of those with either trustee experience or an understanding of
traditional trusteeship values." 30 The competition for directors has
produced a pecking order in the nonprofit world, with "lesser" boards
serving as stepping stones for more important (more visible) boards.'

In effect, the smaller nonprofits serve as the farm system for developing
directorial talent.

In addition, the rise of corporate grant-making and

other external pressures have led nonprofits to adopt more businesslike
once elected, a good pope should never think of himself as pope.
Id. at 101.
126. See, e.g., PFEFFER & SALANCIK, supra note 43, at 236-38 (discussing
executive succession and organizational power). In addition to similarity in formal
schooling and orientation, "individuals in an organizational field undergo anticipatory
socialization to common expectations about their personal behavior, appropriate style of
dress, organizational vocabularies . . . and standard methods of speaking, joking, or
addressing others." DiMaggio & Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited, supra note 48, at 71
(citations omitted). Professors DiMaggio and Powell quote Rosabeth Moss Kantor, in
her 1977 work Men and Women of the Corporation, who described this process as the
"homosexual reproduction of management." Id. at 72.
127. See generally PETER D. HALL, INVENTING THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 135-206
(1992); Brody, supra note 5.
128. See HALL, supra note 127, at 136-37.
129. HODGKINSON, ET AL., supra note 50, at 16. The Internal Revenue Service's
Business Master File of federally tax-exempt organizations necessarily understates the
number of nonprofit organizations, primarily because the Internal Revenue Code excludes
churches from having to file, and does not require registration for very small
organizations. Id. In 1988-89, there were an estimated 350,521 churches, synagogues,
and other religious organizations in the United States. Id. (citing to the annual Yearbook
of American and Canadian Churches and the Statistical Abstract of the United States).
130. HALL, supra note 127, at 137; see also Melissa Middleton, NonprofitBoards
of Directors:Beyond the GovernanceFunction, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, supra note
17, at 141, 144-45 (noting that many nonprofit boards are overwhelmingly dominated by
white male professionals).
131. HALL, supra note 127, at 138.

1996]

AGENTS WITHOUT PRINCIPALS

practices, and to add business executives to their boards."I Nonprofits
must in turn dip lower into the proprietary hierarchy, and these middle
managers view nonprofit board service as a competitive advantage in their
climb to the top of their own business organizations.' 33
No market for corporate control exists in the nonprofit organization.
Henry Manne suggests, in the business context, that the stock market
provides the only objective standard of managerial efficiency.,'
Professor Manne observes that the legal system, as evidenced by the
"business-judgment rule" prevents courts from second-guessing business
decisions or removing directors from the board. 3 5 Accordingly, he
believes, the Securities and Exchange Commission and the courts poorly
protect shareholders with such devices as fiduciary duties and the
shareholders' derivative suit. 36 To Professor Manne, "[o]nly the takeover scheme provides some assurance of competitive efficiency among
corporate managers and thereby affords strong protection to the interests
of vast numbers of small, non-controlling shareholders."' 37 If one
substitutes "public donors" for Professor Manne's "small shareholders"
and the "Internal Revenue Service" for the "Securities and Exchange
Commission," Professor Manne could have been speaking of the
nonprofit, tax-exempt corporation. Thus, we would also expect to find
more nonprofit conservatism, in the sense of lack-of-change (if not
laziness), to the extent that the "market for corporate control" in the
proprietary sector uses the threat of takeover to keep corporations
competitive and efficient.
132. Id. at 138-39.
133. See id. at 209 ("Others, especially aspiring midlevel managers [of proprietary
businesses] faced with constricting opportunities for promotion into the top ranks, saw
voluntarism as a way of gaining a competitive edge over their rivals, mindful not only
of the visibility that volunteering could bring but also of the usefulness of community
contacts as sources of new business."). See generally BRAN O'CONNELL, THE BOARD
MEMBER'S HANDBOOK: MAKING A DIFFERENCE IN VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS (1985)
and the various books, pamphlets, and even videos of the National Center for Nonprofit
Boards (Fall 1995 catalogue on file with The New York Law School Law Review), for
training a new generation of legions of well-intentioned community members not
schooled in noblesse oblige (titles include BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN NONPROFIT AND
FOR-PROFIT BOARD MEMBERS and BEYOND STRATEGIC PLANNING: How TO INVOLVE
NONPROFIT BOARDS IN GROWTH AND CHANGE). Similar training is provided by the
Independent Sector (a trade association of charities).
134. Manne, supra note 81, at 113.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
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Of course, nonprofits still compete with each other, and the
marketplace for their outputs can weed out nonperforming or
nonresponsive organizations. Indeed, nonprofit members have a range of
"voice" and "exit" choices; they can "seek change from within, withhold
financial support, cease to associate with the group, or form a rival group
of their own."' In the religious sector, split-offs commonly occur. As
a more modem example, consider one impetus behind the dramatic
restructuring of Girl Scouts of America: "Lurking in the background like
a corporate raider was the Boy Scouts of America. It had launched a

feasibility study of extending its membership to girls."' 39
2. Whose Mission? 1"

Again, analyzing control separate from ownership raises the question
of what objective a nonprofit seeks to maximize.

141

The vow of

138. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 710 (1990)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). Austin involved the political expenditures of a chamber of
commerce; this Article has generally ignored the many differences between charities and
trade associations (and other mutual-benefit nonprofits, such as labor unions and social
clubs), and the electoral or lobbying activities of either category of nonprofit.
139. See Byrne, supra note 45, at 72 ("The two most popular [Girl Scout]
proficiency badges now are 'Math Whiz' and 'Computer Fun' instead of 'Good
Grooming' and 'Hosting a Party,'" perhaps indicating a competitive response to the Boy
Scouts' threat.).
140. Economists refer to purpose as the "objective function." Nonprofits use the
term "mission." This is more than a difference of semantics. The term "objective
function" begs for a subject-whose objectives? By contrast, the idea of a "mission"
comes supplied with a subject-the reified nonprofit organization, a person in its own
right.
141. Rather than describe the objective function (or purpose) of a particular
organizational form, economists Eugene Fama and Michael Jensen cast choice of
organizational form as a problem in organizational ecology.
Social and economic activities, such as religion, entertainment, education,
research, and the production of other goods and services, are carried on by
different types of organizations, for example, corporations, proprietorships,
partnerships, mutuals, and nonprofits. Most goods and services can be
produced by any form of organization, and there is competition among
organizational forms for survival in any activity. Absent fiat, the form of
organization that survives in an activity is the one that delivers the product
demanded by customers at the lowest price while covering costs.
Fama & Jensen, Agency Problems, supra note 29, at 327. Professors Fama and Jensen's
account suffers from two serious weaknesses. First, they model the nonprofit sector as
a donative world, in which (following Hansmann) the donor is the principal, and the
nonprofit form provides the assurance against appropriation of residual claims. Second,
their model necessarily predicts complete sorting into one or the other sector, and thus
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nondistribution is not necessarily a vow of poverty. 42 But if a nonprofit
is a profit-maximizer, it must be for reasons different from those of a forprofit firm. Remember, there are no residual claimants in a nonprofit.
Because of this nondistribution constraint, the nonprofit organization has
only two choices when it earns a monetary surplus: to reinvest (save) or
to spend. Saving means only postponing the decision of how to spend the
surplus. However the organization resolves the temporal issue, it must
eventually decide how it can better "do good," either by reducing prices
or by increasing costs (whether or not that translates into higher quality).
So even a nonprofit that behaves like a profit-maximizer in the short run
must, over the long run, eventually be a utility maximizer. (The "short
run," however, can be a very long time-universities, for example,
typically spend less than all the earnings from their endowments. 143)
No scholars have found that nonprofit organizations take a vow of
poverty. A few economists have asserted various objective functions for
nonprofits, "such as prestige maximization, maximization of employee
income, redistribution of income, or maximization of a specified
quantity/quality tradeoff."'" One study of tax returns "suggest[s] that
welfare, education, and arts [organizations] are 'service maximizers,'
[while] health firms are budget maximizers." 45 Other economists
assume that nonprofits maximize "disguised profits (discretionary
spending), output quantity and quality and various inputs, such as staff
cannot explain the simultaneous (or transitory) existence of different organizational forms
in some commercial (that is, nondonative) activities, such as hospitals, nursing homes,
and day care centers.
142. Howard P. Tuckman& Cyril F. Chang, NonprofitEquity: A BehavioralModel
and Its Policy Implications, 11 J.POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 76, 77-78 (1992) ("[T]he

vast majority of charitable nonprofit organizations accumulate equity and ... the real
value of their equity grows over time." (citations omitted)).
143. See Joel C. Dobris, Real Return, Modern Portfolio Theory, and College,
University, and FoundationDecisions on Annual Spendingfrom Endowments: A Visit to
the World of Spending Rules, 28 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 49, 70-71 (Spring 1993)

(describing Harvard University's endowment plan); Henry Hansmann, Why Do
Universities Have Endowments?, 19 J.LEGAL STUD. 3, 5 (1990).
144. Richard Steinberg, The Revealed Objective Functions of Nonprofit Firms, 17
RAND J.ECON. 508, 508 (1986) (citing Hansmann); cf. Frangois Abb6-Decarroux, The
Perception of Quality and the Demand for Services: Empirical Application to the
PerformingArts, 23 J.ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 99, 100 (1994) (employing a "notion of
quality that relates to economic effects on demand and/or production costs, and not that
stemming from purely aesthetic considerations," and suggesting that "quality can be
determined only with the help of several criteria of differing types").
145. Steinberg, supra note 144, at 508 (citation omitted).
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size." 146 A social scientist states that nonprofits "tend to maximize their
budgets and program, their influence over their areas of specialization,

and their prestige and autonomy." 4 7 One management article asserts:
"The bottom-line measure of a nonprofit organization's effectiveness is its
survival. Survival is ensured to the extent the manager 'spans the
boundaries' so that the important functions of effective acquisition and
maintenance of resources are performed. "148
The nondistribution constraint in nonprofit law is designed for

enterprises in which the capital requirements are met by donations. In
other words, the suppliers of capital do not demand (and legally cannot
receive) an economic return on capital. This constraint does not bind,
however, in an enterprise with low capital needs, or whose capital needs

can be met through grants, contracts, borrowing or retaining earnings.
For example, many social service organizations rely almost exclusively on
a combination of government contracts and fees for services. 149 Under
these circumstances, returns to capital can be fully satisfied, and a founder

might prefer to cloak the enterprise in nonprofit garb50 in order to
appropriate the "halo" effect of operating as a nonprofit. ,

146. Jerald Schiff & Burton Weisbrod, Competition Between For-Profit and
Nonprofit Organizationsin Commercial Markets, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR IN THE

MIXED ECONOMY, supra note 100, at 127, 129 (footnote omitted).
147. John O'Looney, Beyond Privatizationand Service Integration:Organizational
Models for Service Delivery, 67 Soc. SERV. REV. 501, 512 (1993).
148. Richard D. Heimovics & Robert D. Herman, The Salient Management Skills:
A ConceptualFrameworkforA Curriculumfor Managersin Nonprofit Organizations,19
AM. REV. PUB. ADMIN. 295, 302 (1989).
149. See STEVEN R. SMITH & MICHAEL LIPSKY, NONPROFITS FOR HIRE: THE
WELFARE STATE IN THE AGE OF CONTRACTING 38-39 (1993) (identifying three types of

service nonprofits: the traditional, old-line, usually endowed agency; the small,
grassroots community agency, run on a shoestring budget; and the agencies founded in
the last twenty years, "directly in response to the availability of government funds for
job training, mental health, and other contemporary services"). The move to privatize
social services has caused a surge in the number and size of nonprofit social service
agencies. See, e.g., id. at 6 ("[G]overnment purchase of service contracting with
nonprofit service agencies in Massachusetts rose from $25 million in 1971 to $850
million in 1988." (footnote omitted)).
150. Cf. Burton A. Weisbrod & Mark Schlesinger, Public, Private, Nonprofit
Ownership and the Response to Asymmetric Information: The Case of Nursing Homes,
in THE ECONOMICS OF NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS, supra note 99, at 133, 145:

As recognition of the signal value of institutional form grows, and
organizations enter the industry with the "preferred" form, we can expect
"debasement of the currency" of that form. Organizations will tend to
"disguise" themselves, taking on the formal trappings of the preferred form
while behaving differently. There are barriers to such misrepresented entry
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In particular, a nonprofit's utility function could be either profit

maximization or utility maximization and still be consistent with the legal
bar on paying returns to capital if, as is commonly the case, the
organization engages in a labor-intensive activity. To the extent the

organization increases costs, then labor (and any other favored factor of
production) captures the surplus. Labor costs could increase either by
hiring more labor, or by increasing the compensation paid to existing
labor (either directly or through enhanced working conditions). 5 '
Thus, perhaps we do not see nonprofits providing goods because there
is less of an opportunity by the provider to capture the benefits of

opportunistic behavior.

In the service industries, which are labor-

intensive, the supply-side stakeholders can siphon off the "profit" in
compensation. Manufacturing is more capital-intensive, and presents less

of an opportunity to siphon.'
Resource-constrained nonprofits have recently sought novel sources
of revenue. Charitable conduct of business activities has exploded since
President Ronald Reagan reduced government expenditures on social
services. 5 3 Much of the controversial activity involves the production
of goods embodying no particular information asymmetry, such as
museum gift shops selling reproductions." 4 Economists assume that
• . . [but n]onetheless, disguised entry of this sort is likely to narrow the
differences in organizational behavior.
151. See, e.g., Netzer, supra note 98, at 191-92 (explaining that between 1966 and
1974, a period of large increases in both government and foundation support for the
performing arts, the increase in contributed income to nonprofit theater companies was
almost matched by the total dollar value of the "excess" increases in wages).
152. Cf. Mark Pauly & Michael Redisch, The Not-For-Profit Hospital as a
Physicians' Cooperative, 63 AM. ECON. REv. 87, 98 (1973) ("The supposed quality
consciousness of [not-for-profit] hospitals .

.

.

is easily explained; 'quality' is a

synonym for application of nonphysician labor and capital in physician-income-enhancing
ways . .

").

153. See, e.g., Estelle James, How Nonprofits Grow: A Model, in THE EcONOMICS
OF NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS, supra note 99, at 185, 188 [hereinafter James, How
Nonprofits Grow] (describing plans by National Public Radio to raise money for its radio

production through, among other projects, "the sale of audio cassettes of NPR programs
and the transmission of business information by satellite communication. 'We're prepared

to enter almost any profession except the oldest one,' declared the president of NPR, as
he announced his plans to rely on cross-subsidization increasingly in the years ahead").
"Unrelated" business activities (as defined) are subject to the corporate income tax. See
I.R.C. §§ 511-15 (1994).
154. Proposals to tax these commercial activities have, from time to time, been
advocated by the proprietary sector, but, having worked at the staff level in the Treasury
Department during the latest go-around in 1989, I can attest to the difficulty in trying to
draw lines between "related" and "unrelated" business activities.
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nonprofits engage in these activities (and indeed seek to maximize the
profits from them) as a way to cross-subsidize their preferred nonprofit
activities.' 55 Even where these commercial activities involve information
asymmetry, however, "[o]nce we accept the fact that [nonprofit
organizations] will find it in their utility-maximizing interest to crosssubsidize, and will engage in some activities simply to earn a profit (but
won't tell you ahead of time which these are), the alleged superiority of
[nonprofit organizations] under asymmetric information disappears."' 56
D. Summary of Why Firms Form
In this part, we explored the reasons for the formation of firms,
whether for-profit or nonprofit. Initially, both types of arrangements are
designed to overcome transaction costs in providing goods or services.
However, we saw that because of principal-agent problems, large forprofit firms generally operate independent of shareholder control. While
nonprofits have no shareholders, a close examination of the standard
explanation for nonprofit formation similarly reveals a split between the
patrons and the firm. The nondistribution constraint is supposed to
overcome agency costs by inducing patrons to trust nonprofits, whose
outputs the patrons cannot judge because of information asymmetry.
Unfortunately wanting to deal with a trustworthy supplier does not
guarantee the existence of a trustworthy supplier.
As a negative
constraint, the nondistribution constraint does not ensure that the
organization spends its money in any particular way. In addition,
nonprofits almost exclusively provide services, and the law generally
permits competitive returns to labor; the nondistribution constraint bars
only returns to equity capital. Accordingly, certain in service industries,
"for-profits in disguise" can seek to appropriate the halo of nonprofit
status without a large cost to the founders/managers.

III.

INSIDE THE BLACK Box: MANAGEMENT OF THE FIRM

Neoclassical economics deals with markets-the interaction of
producers and consumers, and the dynamics of how prices are set by
competition. Once economic activity became concentrated in firms,
neoclassical economics concluded that the market sets prices through the
155. See James, How Nonprofits Grow, supra note 153, at 187 ("Because the
[nonprofit] manager has tastes, preferring to deliver one service rather than another, and
because some of the preferred services may not cover their own costs, these
organizations characteristically find themselves taking on profit-making activities that will
cover the deficit incurred in other activities.").
156. James, Comments, supra note 99, at 155.
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interaction of firms. The neoclassical economist ignored what went on
within the producing enterprise: the firm was a "black box," and all firms
were considered to make the most efficient use of their internal resources
in order to maximize profits. 157 Then came a revolution in economics
as radical as atomic physics was to Newtonian physics.
Economists recognized that their emphasis on markets "relegated the
study of organizations to business schools, or worse still, to
sociologists."' 5 8 Herbert Simon recently suggested that "organizational
economy" would be a more appropriate way than "market economy" to
describe developed countries. 59 Recognizing that most producers are
employees rather than owners, Professor Simon describes their lack of
incentives to maximize the profits of firms, since profits redound to the
benefit of owners. Professor Simon views the problem as universal:
"profit-making firms, nonprofit organizations, and bureaucratic
organizations all have exactly the same problem of inducing their
employees to work toward the organizational goals. " " Thus, he
concludes, organizational form does not, a priori, make it any easier (or
harder) to align the interests of the employees with organizational goals,
regardless of whether those goals are profit-maximization or anything

else. 161
In other words, we find a second, internal principal-agent problem,
where the management is the principal and the employees are the agents.
The difficulties and constraints of managing the firm alter the goals and
purposes of the firm itself. Regardless of how much the principals want
a firm to act in their interests, strong forces cause organizations to behave
in the interests of all of their workers, which is one reason firms of all
forms come to look so much alike. In various ways, organizations copy
each other and adopt the standards dictated by broadly based constituents.
Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell, in a famous account of
"institutional isomorphism," identify three types of mimicry to "help
explain the observations that organizations are becoming more
homogeneous and that elites often get their way, while at the same time
enabling us to understand the irrationality, the frustration of power, and
157. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Symposium on Organizationsand Economics, 5 J. ECON.
15, 15 (1991) ("Many economists argued that there was no need to look carefully
into the black box called the firm: firms maximized profits (stock market value); if
managers didn't, they would be replaced; and firms that didn't maximize value wouldn't
PERSP.

survive.").
158. Id.
159. Herbert A. Simon, Organizations and Markets, 5 J.ECON. PIRSP. 25, 28

(1991).
160. Id.
161. Id.
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the lack of innovation that are so commonplace in organizational life." 62
First, DiMaggio and Powell find "coercive isomorphism," resulting from
adherence to standardized procedures and structures imposed on an
organization, either as a result of government regulation, affiliated group
agreement, or satisfaction of a particular resource on which the
organization depends. 63 Second, Professors DiMaggio and Powell find
that, as a response to uncertainty, organizations voluntarily imitate or
model themselves after other organizations that they perceive to be more
legitimate or successful." 6 Finally, professionalism provides normative
pressures to conform. Professors DiMaggio and Powell find that the
recent growth in the professional classes primarily occurred among the
managers and specialized staff of large organizations. 65
As discussed above, the public values nonprofit organizations for their
perceived diversity and flexibility when compared with the public sector.
Nevertheless, nonprofits are no less firms than are for-profits. Innovation
is hard to produce under a "population ecology" theory of organizations:
"Once an organization has made a public claim to mobilize resources, has
induced individuals to cede some control in return for specific
inducements, has invested in physical and human capital of specific types,
and has designed a product or service to appeal to a certain audience, it
has greatly limited its range of feasible transformations." '1 The theory
of organizational inertia explains why newly created organizations are less
likely to survive than older organizations (the "liability of newness"), 167
and "death rates" of organizations apparently decline exponentially as
organizations age.'68 So how does innovation in an industry occur? If
the demand side remains heierogenous, while organizations become more
homogeneous, then the growing unfulfilled demand for products and
services "creates opportunities for 'outlaw' entrepreneurs to experiment
with new organizational forms."19
162. DiMaggio & Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited, supra note 48, at 79.
163. Id. at 67-69.
164. Id. at 69-70 ("Thus in the arts one can find textbooks on how to organize a
community arts council or how to start a symphony women's guild.").
165. Id. at 70-73; see infra part IV.
166. Michael T. Hannan & John Freeman, Structural Inertia and Organizational
Change, 49 AM. Soc. REv. 149, 156 (1984).
167. Id. at 157 ("[lit takes time for an organization to acquire institutional reality
to its members and to become valued in its own right.").
168. Id. at 158 ("Old organizations tend to develop dense webs of exchange, to
affiliate with centers of power, and to acquire an aura of inevitability.").
169. Walter W. Powell, Expandingthe Scope of InstitutionalAnalysis, in THE NEW
INSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 48, at 183, 198 (discussing Professor Hannan's work).
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A. The Balance of Power Between Board and Executive
A board of directors can greatly harm the organization by defaulting
its
on monitoring function. Dominating, charismatic chief executives fill
the business world, and not in just small, family-owned businesses.
"Microsoft" means Bill Gates; 70 in the not-too-distant past "Apple"
meant Steve Jobs, and "Chrysler" meant Lee Iacocca. William Agee
"CEO disease"-the
nearly brought down Morrison-Knudson.' 7 '
egotistical chief executive-can be fatal to a company."~
In the proprietary sector, we find opposing theories of good corporate
governance, both based on the information asymmetry enjoyed by
management. "Inside directors"-those who hold management positions
within the nonprofit corporation-are already most familiar with the
organization's operations, if not the policy issues. Corporate officers seek
board participation because they believe their superior knowledge of the
workings of the business enhance board decision making. To those most
worried about agency theory, however, information asymmetry results in
the foxes guarding the henhousei 7 3 Because the management can
behave opportunistically, the shareholders need an independent board of
directors in order to protect their interests.

Some legal reformers advocate that a majority of the boards of large

corporations be outsiders. 7 4 Melvin Eisenberg argues that as a practical
matter the typical board is passive, allowing most of its functions to be
performed by senior management while retaining only the task of selecting
170. See G. PASCAL ZACHERY, SHOWSTOPPER! 232 (1994) ("The richest American
by virtue of his roughly seven billion dollars in Microsoft stock, Gates was an object of
envy and awe, paranoia and adulation .... The real Gates resembled a big-city political

boss; more Richard Daley than Rockefeller. This was because his power depended on
both exploiting and nurturing a chain of dependents, everyone from applications writers
to PC makers to customers.").
171. See, e.g., Diana B. Henriques, Ties That Bind: His Directors, Her Charity,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1995, at Dl.
172. John A. Byrne et al., CEO Disease, Bus. WK., Apr. 1, 1991, at 52, 54 ("It
is still rare when the board of directors or a company's shareholders . . . hold a
corporate chieftain accountable before it's too late.").

173. See Ronald J.Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing The Outside Director:
An Agenda For InstitutionalInvestors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863, 872-76 (1991).
174. E.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, Legal Models of Management Structure in the
Modern Corporation:Officers, Directors,andAccountants, 63 CAL. L. REV. 375 (1975).
Eisenberg was the reporter for the American Law Institute's "corporate governance
project," the initial draft of which contained a majority-outsider rule. See Stephen M.
Bainbridge, IndependentDirectorsand the ALl CorporateGovernanceProject, 61 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 1034, 1040 (1993).
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and monitoring the chief executive, a task it does poorly.' 7 5 Reformers
fail to recognize, however, that we can give opposite accounts of
independent directors. 76
As Stephen Bainbridge phrases it: "The
faithful monitor story posits that independent directors assiduously carry
out their oversight obligations. In contrast, the rubber stamp story claims
that they are little more than management puppets."'
Being both
independent and a director seems to require the impossible: remedying the
information asymmetry without devoting full-time resources to
management; avoiding the natural tendency to shun conflict and favor
incumbent management;
and overcoming the free-rider problem of any
178
group activity.
Much has been made of the recent increase in "outside" directors on
the boards of publicly traded corporations. As of 1987, seventy percent
of directors were outsiders. 179 As a separate measure, only fifty percent
of corporations had a majority of outside directors in 1938; this percentage
surged to eighty-three percent by 1979.180 One can question how
independent these outside directors really are because the chief executive
officers, who generally identify potential board candidates, like to place
CEOs of other companies on their boards. The risk, of course, is that the
successful candidates would return the favor by drawing the line between
the board's role and management's role too often to the benefit of
management.' 8
Being an outside director can result in richer management experience,
allowing for better decision-making by that director at his or her "day"
job."s One surveyed director commented: "I can give you a long list
of situations I've handled better here at my company because I've been
through them or seen them or thought them through elsewhere as an
outside board member. It's a great opportunity."83
Overlapping
175. MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 139-41, 16268 (1976); see also MYLES L. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY 184-90 (1971).
Bainbridge reminds us how old this complaint is. Bainbridge, supra note 174, at 106263 n.145 (citing William 0. Douglas, DirectorsWho Do Not Direct, 47 HARV. L. REV.
1305 (1934)).

176. See Bainbridge, supra note 174, at 1058.
177. Id.

178. See id. at 1059-61.
179. JAY W. LORSCH WITH ELIZABETH MACIVER, PAWNS OR POTENTATES: THE
REALITY OF AMERICA'S CORPORATE BOARDS 17 (1989).
180. Id. at 17-18 (citations omitted).
181. Id. at 18-19.
182. Id. at 27.

183. Id.
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management and board service, however, result in a guild of outside
directors.
How does the board/management power relationship change, if at all,
in a nonprofit? Can we predict that the lack of shareholders will
effectively increase the power of executives of charitable organizations
relative to the board?
Dennis Young, in a book subtitled A Behavioral Theory of the
Nonprofit Sector Based on Entrepreneurship, developed a theory that
entrepreneurs possessing various characteristics sort themselves into
appropriate fields and reward structures. '1
Screening or self-selection occurs on the basis of differences in
structural variables among sectors ....such as income potential
and intrinsic character of the work to be performed. The
differential filtering of motivation into sectors that allow room for
managerial discretion determines the ultimate behavior of firms.
Thus, for nonprofits, according to Hansmann's and Weisbrod's
analyses, the screening process may be expected to produce
organizational activity that .is less tuned to pecuniary
aggrandizement than that of firms in the profit-making part of the
economy."'
In general, Professor Young finds that the nonprofit sector primarily
attracts those he categorizes variously as believers, conserves, poets,
searchers, and professional varieties of entrepreneur. 1 6 Nevertheless,
he cautions that a nonprofit board, even more than a proprietary board,
might need to keep a close eye on its chief executive, because "output is
more difficult to measure and managerial rewards are only loosely related
to changes in organizational wealth." 87
To some, the nonprofit board is a greater force than the for-profit
board."8 However, others suggest that we should reverse the usual

184. DENNIS R. YOUNG, IF NOT FOR PROFIT, FOR WHAT? (1983); see also Jane
M. Howell & Peter J. Frost, A Laboratory Study of CharismaticLeadership, 43 ORG.
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 243 (1989).
185. YOUNG, supra note 184, at 16-17.
186. Id. at 140.
187. Id. at 94 (quoting Kenneth W. Clarkson, Some Implications of PropertyRights
in HospitalManagement, 15 J.L. & ECON. 363 (1972)).
188. See, e.g., Peter F. Drucker, What Business CanLearnfrom Nonprofits, HARV.
Bus. REv., July-Aug. 1989, at 88, 90:

Many nonprofit boards now have what is still the exception in business-a

functioning board. They also have something even rarer: a CEO who is
clearly accountable to the board and whose performance is reviewed annually
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business hierarchy and place the nonprofit chief executive above the
board.

9

Perhaps chief executives often appear more dominating in the

nonprofit sector only because nonprofit directors usually exhibit an

extreme form of the characteristics already seen in proprietary boards' 90
-outside nonprofit directors tend to be time-constrained volunteers,'
to be chosen for their relationships to certain key constituencies of the
by a board committee. And they have what is rarer still: a board whose
performance is reviewed annually against preset performance objectives.
See also Byrne, supra note 45, at 69 (describing management techniques of various
nonprofits):
Ah, yes, the directors. The bane of many a CEO. Perhaps there is no better
example of what the nonprofits have to teach Corporate America. What is
often viewed as little more than a necessary evil in corporate executive suites
has become a prized source of expertise and a reality check for nonprofit
managers.
189. See Heimovics & Herman, supra note 148, at 307-08, 309 n.13 ("We were
unprepared for the fact that both actors and observers in our research found the
[nonprofit chief executive] as responsible for all nonprofit organizational outcomes, both
successes and failures."). At the very least, the relationship between the executive
director and the board consists of "strange loops and tangled hierarchies." Middleton,
supra note 130, at 149-51. "IiB]oard members are part-time volunteers who may serve
as trustees for a variety of noneconomic reasons, such as the desires to become more
fully integrated into the community, to develop new circles of friends, and to gain status
and prestige." Id. at 144.
190. See, e.g., The Invisible Band, ECONOMIST, Oct. 8, 1994, at 81, 81 (reforms
of proprietary boards "depend on non-executives, who are paid a pittance and expected
to behave as hard-nosed businessmen, referees, coaches, visionaries and saints, while
giving only a few days a year to the job.").
191. See Deborah A. De Mott, Self-Dealing TransactionsinNonprofit Corporations,
59 BRoOK. L. REv. 131, 140 (1993) (discussing the different motives and incentives of
directors of nonprofit boards, as compared with those of business corporation directors).
Professor De Mott observes that:
Most nonprofits do not compensate their directors directly. Board members
often join because they believe in an organization's mission and contribute to
it with financial donations. They depend heavily on organization management
to set the board's agenda and provide information to the board. Many large
nonprofits also have relatively large boards.
Id. (footnotes omitted). The National Charities Information Bureau adopted standards
prohibiting the payment of fees to directors (although participation costs may be paid).
Id. at 140 n.46. However, "[s]ome actors in this environment reportedly believe that
directors who make financial contributions have a reciprocal entitlement to self-deal."
Id. at 140. Perhaps the obvious solution is to allow nonprofits to pay reasonable fees for
services to financially-strapped directors.
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nonprofit," 9 and to lack technical proficiency in the "business" of the
nonprofit.'93
B. Organizational Behavior and Productive Efficiency
Examining the internal operations of an organization strongly
challenges the classic assumption that proprietary businesses seek to
maximize profits. In the 1950s the Carnegie School began developing
theories of organizational behavior." 9 Herbert Simon's pathbreaking
work found that corporate managers tend to engage in "satisficing," that
is, managing inputs (physical and human) at merely a satisfactory rate
(subject to making a profit) rather than at a profit-maximizing rate."9
Similarly, Richard Cyert and James March identified the multiple and
192. Cf. Middleton, supra note 130, at 141 ("To control any external dependencies,
an organization can place on its board representatives of important external groups or
constituencies and define as one of the board's functions the task of mediating its
relationships with these key elements.").
193. See, e.g., JOHN S. GLASER, THE UNITED WAY SCANDAL 207-08 (1994),
describing how William Aramony, president of United Way of America, controlled board
meetings:
[Miaterial presented to the Board had already been reviewed and massaged,
either by the officers or by the committee chairmen so as to eliminate any
dissension at meetings. Board members who often disagreed or asked
embarrassing questions were not given committee assignments and eventually
left the board. I never heard any comment about a board meeting other than,
"Great meeting, wasn't it?"
See also Middleton, supra note 130, at 144 (one nonprofit staff criticized the
board's lack of technical expertise, and "[thus], the very characteristics that legitimated
the boards' external representation functions created tensions between board and staff.").
But see id. at 149 (in nonprofits with "noisy" boards, those who also have constituent
representatives, "[u]nclear authority relationships between board and management may
develop, and the board may encroach on staff's administrative functions.").
194. See Harvey Leibenstein, Organizationalor FrictionalEquilibria,X-Efflciency,
and the Rate ofInnovation, 83 Q.J. ECON. 600, 601 n.2 (1969) [hereinafter Leibenstein,
Innovation]. My historical account of industrial economics is necessarily abbreviated,
and omits discussion of important works by economists including: KENNETH J. ARROW,
ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK-BEARING (1971); CHESTER I. BARNARD, THE
FUNCTIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE (1938); JOHN R. COMMONS, INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS
(1934); and FRANK H. KNIGHT, PH.D., RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT (1921); and
by legal academics including Archibald Cox, The Legal Nature of Collective Bargaining
Agreements, 57 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1958) and Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price Contract?
An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704 (1931). For a general overview of
transaction cost economics, see the prologue to WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS,

supra note 15, at 1-12.
195. See generally H. Simon, A BehavioralModel, supra note 94.
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conflicting goals a business corporation harbors: they assumed not only "a
profit goal[, but also] a sales goal, a market share goal, an inventory goal,
and a production goal."' 96 Professors Cyert and March observed that
primacy for each of these goals is pressed by members of coalitions within
the organization, based on their independent aspirations. 11 As a result
of these "more or less independent" goals, bargaining must occur among
potential coalition members as short-run pressures demand. 91 8
Professors Cyert and March further described the concept of
"organizational slack"-a cushion of excess labor and unaggressive
business practices, built up out of retained profits during fat years to be
trimmed or reformed during lean years.' 99 As a result of these
mechanisms, the corporation has the flexibility to adapt over time as "the
decentralization of decision making (and goal attention), the sequential
attention to goals, and the adjustment in organizational slack permit the
business firm to make decisions with inconsistent goals under many (and
perhaps most) conditions."'
In sum, practices such as crisis
management and the adoption of routines "follow from the view of
decision making as a political process.""'
Slightly different from Cyert and March's theory of organizational
slack is Harvey Leibenstein's theory of "X-efficiency." 2 °
This
management concept describes the increased inputs that can be produced
with a better deployment of given inputs. 2' 3 More commonly, scholars
refer to the antonym "X-inefficiency," defined as the degree to which
196. CYERT & MARCH, supra note 56, at 117.

197. Id.
198. Id. at 43.
199. Id. at 36-38; c

ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY 15

(1970). Hirschman puts a slightly different slant on slack, viewing it like a human law

of thermodynamics:
[Slack] is continuously being generatedas a result of some sort of entropy
characteristic of human, surplus-producing societies ....
Firms and other
organizations are conceived to be permanently and randomly subject to decline
and decay, that is, to a gradual loss of rationality, efficiency, and surplusproducing energy, no matter how well the institutional framework within

which they function is designed.
Id.
200. CYERT & MARCH, supra note 56, at 43.
201. Powell & DiMaggio, supra note 58, at 1, 19.
202. See Harvey Leibenstein, Allocative Efficiency vs. "X-Efficiency", 56 AM.

ECON. REv. 394 (June 1966) [hereinafter Leibenstein, Efficiency]; see also Leibenstein,
Innovation, supra note 194; HARvEY LEIBENSTEIN, INSIDE THE FIRM: THE
INEFFICIENCIES OF HIERARCHY (1987) [hereinafter LEIBENSTEIN, INSIDE THE FIRM].

203. See Leibenstein, Efficiency, supra note 202.
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actual output falls short of maximum output for given inputs.'
Leibenstein observes: "The simple fact is that neither individuals nor firms
work as hard, nor do they search for information as effectively, as they
could." 5 He identifies four reasons why given inputs cannot produce
predetermined outputs: (1) labor contracts cannot be drafted to cover every
possible situation; (2) some factors of production are not marketed; (3) the
firm cannot completely specify (or even know) its production function;
and (4) competing firms, because of interdependence and uncertainty, find
themselves tacitly cooperating in some respects, and imitating each other's
techniques.'
As Professor Leibenstein concludes, "where competitive
pressure is light, many people will trade the disutility of greater effort, of
search, and the control of other peoples' activities for the utility of feeling
less pressure and of better interpersonal relations.'
To Professor Leibenstein, some human inputs more readily translate
into predictable output than others. Thus, he distinguishes "marginal
product" employees, for whom one can easily calculate their value added
to output, from "non-marginal product" employees, whose value added
might be very costly, difficult, inefficient, or unconventional to
calculate. 3 Professor Leibenstein gives as examples not just owners,
managers, and supervisory employees, but also some employees with staff
jobs, such as accountants, engineers, and secretaries.'
To Professor
Leibenstein, perfect efficiency cannot be achieved because of the costs of
innovation. That is, fins that do not innovate their operations have
implicitly decided that the costs of making the change to the required level
of effort exceed the utility of the potential net gain. Costs are high not
just because of one person's unwillingness to change, but also because of
group dynamics:
Some people believe that they will gain by the adoption; others
are neutral, while still others may fear that they will lose ...
Somehow the promoter or promoters have to persuade the
members of the group that no one will lose or that there are
reapportionments of the gains possible so that potential losers will
be compensated, or else the power structure has to be such that
204. Id.

205. Id. at 407.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Id.
Id. at 413.
Leibenstein, Innovation, supra note 194, at 602.
Id. at 602-03.
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those who gain can somehow force their decision upon those who
lose. xo
Unless the firm can create appropriate incentives for its employees,
innovation will fail. Because "the nature of the employment relation is
such that individuals are not given full vested rights in the gains from a
change," the group could discount the gains to the point that they fall
short of the losses, and thus resist innovation. 2 '
Economists continued to refine a model of organizational behavior.
Oliver Williamson's pioneering work in the New Industrial Economics,
begun in the 1960s, brought new understanding of how internal firm
structure can elicit effort through hierarchies and peer-group
sanctions.2 1 He also identified the downside of hierarchies: information
"degrades" as it is passed up the chain, and the top (policy making) level
can be far removed from the lowest (detailed information-gathering)
layers. Hierarchy both reduces the effectiveness of monitoring and dilutes
the "message from the top."
Moreover, "the real principals
(stockholders) are usually not in a position to state their specific interest,
however imperfectly."23
In 1977, Alfred Chandler published The Visible Hand, in which he
emphasized the hegemony of a professional managerial class. Indeed,
Professor Chandler characterized the modern business enterprise as
"managerial capitalism."2"4 Once "modern business enterprise took the
place of market mechanisms in coordinating the activities of the economy
and allocating its resources, . . . it became the most powerful institution
in the American economy and its managers the most influential group of
economic decision makers." 21 5 Reminiscent of Berle and Means's work
almost half a century earlier, Professor Chandler observed that the
210. Id. at 614.

211. Id. at 615.
212. See generally OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON,

MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES:

ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 41-56 (1975).

213. Leibenstein, Efficiency, supra note 202. While management fashions change
with dizzying speed, techniques include management hierarchies, peer-group monitoring,
and systems to bifurcate decisions between "management (initiation and implementation)
and control (ratification and monitoring)." Fama & Jensen, Separationof Ownership and
Control,supra note 124, at 308, as well as the more recent quality circles, joint workermanagement groups, and matrix management.
214. ALFRED D.

CHANDLER,

JR.,

THE VISIBLE HAND:

THE MANAGERIAL

REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 1 (1977) [hereinafter CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE
HAND]; see also ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE: CHAPTERS
IN THE HISTORY OF THE INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE (1962).
215. CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE HAND, supra note 214, at 1.
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increasing size and complexity of the modem business enterprise
demanded increasingly professionalized managers, separating management
from ownership. 6 As a result of this power shift, "in making
administrative decisions, career managers preferred policies that favored
the long-term stability and growth of their enterprises to those that
maximized current profits." 21 7 When faced with high profits, managers
"preferred to reinvest them in the enterprise rather than pay them out [to
shareholders] in dividends. "218 That is to say, the utility function of the
business firm becomes the utility maximization of the
managers-preserving and improving their jobs.
One scholar extends this existential view of firms to the public
sector-as well as to the nonprofit sector. All organizations, asserts Barry
Bozeman, seek stable growth, autonomy, and control: "The mission of
the organization is less important than these basic motivations, and these
motivations are21 only
minimally affected by the presence or absence of a
9
profit motive."
Indeed, no one inside the black box of the firm behaves as if work is
just a chance to make profits for the firm: "[W]hile companies must serve
shareholders' interests, neither their executives nor their employees leap
from bed in the morning in order to maximize the risk-adjusted present
value of streams of future cash flows."'
Rather, twentieth-century
American workers define themselves, in many ways, in relation to the
society they find at the work placeY1

216. Id. at 1-6.
217. Id. at 10.
218. Id.
219. BARRY BOZEMAN, ALL ORGANIZATIONS ARE PUBLIC: BRIDGING PUBLIC AND

PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONAL THEORIES 149 (1987).
220. Joseph L. Badaracco, Jr., Business Ethics: Four Spheres of Executive

Responsibility, 34 CAL. MGMT. REV. 64, 72 (1992).
221. See, e.g., RONALD INGLEHART, CULTURE SHIFT IN ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL
SOCIETY (1990); DANIEL YANKELOVICH ET AL., THE WORLD AT WORK: AN
INTERNATIONAL REPORT ON JOBS, PRODUCTIVITY, AND HUMAN VALUES (1985). Work
contains positive utilities that are socially and historically structured,
whether as expression of an identity (I work or I am a metal worker), a
relative performance (I am a good metal worker), social value (It is good to
be a metal worker), gender (It is good for a man to be a metal worker), or
social status (It is better to be a metal worker than a salesperson).
Friedland & Alford, supra note 114, at 232, 234.
For a discussion of the dark side of spending more and more time at work, see
JULIET B. SCHOR, THE OVERWORKED AMERICAN: THE UNEXPECTED DECLINE OF

LEISURE (1991).
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C. Nonprofit Operations:X-Inefficiencies,
Cross-Subsidizing, and Competition

How different is the nonprofit sector? Once economists turned their
attention to non-proprietary enterprises, such as government and
nonprofits, they expected to find even greater organizational slack and Xinefficiencies.'
Management schools recently have begun examining
the nonprofit sector,' and you can now find books like Managing the

Non-Profit Organization, by management expert Peter Drucker, on the

shelves of local bookstores?224
Aside from any possible malfeasance they might commit, charity

managers can manage a nonprofit in ways that prevent the nondistribution
constraint from operating as its proponents hope. Even without
distribution of profits, two types of information asymmetries persist with
regard to the "value" a patron is getting from a charity. First, the charity
might have high X-inefficiencies, either productive inefficiencies (such as
a relaxed work environment) or the cross-subsidization of another "good"

(such as charity care by a hospital, or the employment of beneficiaries
rather than professional staff). Second, the patron may be faced with
more than one competing charity, and the nondistribution constraint
provides no way of choosing among them.
222. See, e.g., Regina E. Herzlinger & William S. Krasker, Who Profits from
Nonprofits?, HARV. Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1987, at 93, 104 ("[W]e believe nonprofit
managers could perform even better if they were freed of the limitations imposed by the
nonprofit setting and could operate in a for-profit environment with its clearer incentives
and measures of performance."); Weisbrod & Schlesinger, supra note 150, at 142-43
(finding greater organizational slack in nonprofit nursing homes than in for-profit nursing
homes, except for church-owned and public institutions, whose administrators, perhaps,
"are less motivated by financial incentives").
223. See, e.g., Byrne, supra note 45, at 67-68 ("To cope with their changing
environment, the leaders of nonprofits are steeping themselves in professional
management techniques, even attending management sessions at Harvard, Stanford, and
Wharton.").
224. PETER F. DRUCKER, MANAGING THE NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATION: PRACTICES

AND PRINCIPLES (1990) (includes interviews with nonprofit executives). Incidentally,
Drucker uses many examples from the business sector. Publisher John Wiley & Sons
produces a series of titles in its "Nonprofit Law, Finance, and Management Series." The
list currently stands at 11, including the Financialand Accounting Guide for Not-forProfit Organizationsand Fund-Raising:EvaluatingandManagingthe FundDevelopment
Process. See also supra note 133 discussing the numerous texts to improve nonprofit
governance, published by the Independent Sector and by the National Center for
Nonprofit Boards.
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According to the standard analysis, efficiency takes a back seat to
"mission"' in an organization where no shareholders demand profitmaximization,' and where goals are deliberately made fuzzy in order

to avoid antagonizing conflicting constituencies.

Nonproprietary

enterprises (whether private or public) operate with a higher degree of

slack, or X-inefficiency-avoiding conflict, reducing tension, valuing
"fairness,"'n and making the nonprofit a more pleasant place to work.
One might think that a nonprofit would engage in less opportunistic
behavior than a proprietary enterprise. This depends, however, on how

one defines "opportunistic."'

There is no reason for automatically

assuming that for-profits will engage in opportunistic behavior and

nonprofits will not. 2 9

Professor Hansmann posits that only a few

consumers actually calculate the benefits of dealing with nonprofits, and

the rest of the public uses nonprofit status as a signal of
trustworthiness.Y °

Many economists simply ignore the fact that for-

225. See, e.g., Byrne, supra note 45, at 68 ("'Many of the good people who come
up in the nonprofit world generally rise for reasons other than their interest or skill in
management,' says John W. Gardner, a professor at Stanford University.").
226. Economists believe that nonprofits are "inherently subject to productive
inefficiency (that is, failure to minimize costs) owing to the absence of ownership claims
to residual earnings." Hansmann, Economic Theoriesof Nonprofit Organization,supra
note 17, at 38 (citations omitted).
227. Cf. BOZEMAN, supra note 219, at 36 (citation omitted), in which the author
discusses the issue of efficiency in the public sector:
[I]f efficiency is the minimization of waste, the relationship of politics to
efficiency is not so clear. Politics is less often a source of waste than an
additional (that is, noneconomic) set of allocational criteria. Claims of equity,
redistribution of resources, and regulation of hazardous practices and products
often conflict with efficiency objectives.
228. WEISBROD, supra note 18, at 222 n.23 ("The notion that one form of
institution might be more trustworthy than another is not part of mainstream thinking in
economics, but it may well affect consumer actions.").
229. See Weisbrod & Schlesinger, supra note 150, at 136 ("[N]onproprietary
organizations will be more likely or less likely to misrepresent than proprietary
organizations, depending on whether misrepresentation is more or less consistent with
nonpecuniary or pecuniary forms of rewards.").
230. Professor Hansmann avers that only through long-run experience with specific
providers does the public come to "develop a sense that in certain circumstances it is
most appropriate to deal with nonprofits. Undoubtedly for most consumers such attitudes
are learned from others rather than based upon conscious reflection." Hansmann, Role
of Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 7, at 896. It is sufficient for Professor Hansmann
that "some subset of patrons has a general notion that when an organization is nonprofit
it is somehow committed to operating for some purpose other than profit maximization."
Id. at 897. He concludes: "In general, social institutions and patterns of behavior may
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profits worry a great deal about their reputations. For example,
Professors Ben-Ner and Van Hoomissen assume that reputation is a
governor of last resort," and when they assert that for-profits will
extract consumer surplus, they neglect to mention reputation at all. 2
Dennis Young reminds us that trustworthiness contains two
independent components: "[flulf'llment of promises, that is, delivery of
services as advertised, and abstinence from fraud and depreciation of
quality as strategies for self-aggrandizement. " '
He quotes Bruce
Vladek's influential study of the nursing home industry, which observed
that government investigators found no statistical correlation between
stealing and poor care. Indeed, investigators found that
many of the biggest crooks ran moderate to very good nursing
homes, while some of those who ran poor nursing homes were
more incompetent than dishonest . .. The most intelligent and
farsighted crooks might endeavor to run especially good facilities
in order to maintain good relations with regulatory
authorities .
Z
. and develop a positive professional reputation. 4
Even if the nonprofit operates at a high level of productive efficiency,
the nonprofit might use the surplus to cross-subsidize activities for which
there is no market. For example, a hospital might sell medical services
at fair market value (as set by the third-party reimburser and for-profit
competitors) and use the surplus to do medical research or community
education that no one otherwise pays for." No matter how meritorious
the cross-subsidization, how can a donor or patron be sure that her money
represent a reasonable degree of economic rationality even when most of the individuals
involved are not self-consciously engaged in intricate processes of economically rational
thought." Id.
231. Ben-Ner & Van Hoomissen, supra note 117, at 34 n.5 (in general), 36-37
(automobile repair).
232. See id. at 38.
233. YOUNG, supra note 184, at 128.
234. Id. (quoting from BRUCE C.

VLADEK,

UNLOVING CARE: THE NURSING HOME

TRAGEDY 186-87 (1980)).
235. There might be less cross-subsidization occurring than we think. See, e.g.,
Michael Rothschild & Lawrence J. White, The University in the Marketplace: Some
Insights and Some Puzzles, in STUDIES

OF SUPPLY AND DEMAND IN HIGHER EDUCATION

11, 11-16 (Charles T. Clotfelter & Michael Rothschild eds., 1993) (expressing skepticism
of the old assumption that undergraduatetuition cross-subsidizes graduate education; after
all, universities must compete on price with free-standing colleges).
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is being used to provide the service that she wants? 1

6

This pattern

illustrates that the nondistribution constraint, while perhaps helpful,"
is not a sufficient bond to align the interests of management with the

interests of patrons. 238

As a separate matter, assuming the public prefers dealing with a

nonprofit enterprise to dealing with a for-profit enterprise in certain cases,
what happens when there are two (or more) nonprofits?

9

The

nondistribution constraint account cannot answer the next obvious
question: Once more than one nonprofit organization exists to supply the
desired trust good or service, how does the information disadvantaged
236. Even retaining funds to build up a surplus is a form of cross-subsidization.
See, e.g., Tuckman & Chang, supra note 142, at 85 ("[W]hen nonprofits are free to
accumulate large sums of equity without informing the donors of the organizations'
actions ....

a contract failure occurs in the market for donations .

").

237. The nondistribution constraint could even be harmful if a profit-sharing or
other incentive compensation agreement would attract and motivate more competent
management or protect the nonprofit from unwanted risk.
238. Indeed, one commentator, Dean Robert Charles Clark, goes so far as to say
that the uses to which a for-profit hospital puts its surplus have more social utility than
the uses to which a nonprofit hospital puts its surplus. Even at a positivistic level, a forprofit earns a greater surplus because its profit motive forces it to closely monitor costs,
while nonprofit operations suffer from inefficiencies in order to minimize employee
conflict. Robert C. Clark, Does the Nonprofit Form Fit the Hospital Industry?, 93
HARv. L. REv. 1416, 1459-62 (1980) (discussing Clarkson, supra note 187). A forprofit, Dean Clark says, earns a surplus to distribute to its shareholders, but a nonprofit
uses its (surreptitiously obtained) surplus to cross-subsidize the provision of medical
research and indigent care. See id. at 1468. "When a local hospital finances its public
goods and its medical services for the poor by overcharging-essentially, collecting
taxes-from paying patients and third-party insurers, it acts in an arbitrary and capricious
way." Id. In effect, to Dean Clark the only acceptable utility that a hospital should be
permitted to maximize is the low cost or high quality of services provided to current
paying patients. Id. at 1466-71.
239. I am speaking of two nonprofits that are substitutes for each other. When
ideological competition arises, both charities might benefit, as illustrated by Professor
Rose-Ackerman:
[S]uppose that some ideological positions are abhorrent to the donor. He loses
utility for every client served by these charities. A devout Baptist might feel
worse off the greater the number of children cared for in Roman Catholic daycare centers. He may feel part of a competitive ideological struggle and give
more to his favorite Baptist charity, the more clients are served by the Catholic
charity.
Susan Rose-Ackerman, Do Government Grants to Charity Reduce Private Donations?,
in THE ECONOMICS OF NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS, supra note 99, at 318, 318. Similarly,
"if donors strongly dislike the ideology of charities subsidized by government, they may
give more to their own favored charities." Id. at 325.
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consumer or donor choose between the nonprofit suppliers? In order to
answer this question, we cannot limit ourselves to the market-because the
hypothesis postulates market failure.2 ' °
That is, by assumption
information asymmetries prevent the public from judging the quality of the

output. But if no one can judge quality-not the insiders, not auditors, not
clientele-then by definition no one can earn a (justified) reputation-and

no nonprofit could lose it.24 Does this imply that, in the absence of a
monopoly, competition in the nonprofit sector will ultimately be based on
price, perhaps at the expense of quality?242
Many who believe competition to be healthy in the proprietary sector

seem to believe that nonprofit competition wastes charitable resources.243
Such a belief has a long history. As the newly wealthy mercantile and
industrial class devoted funds to philanthropic work in the 19th century,
some deplored the "indiscriminate charity" that a diverse nonprofit sector

240. As George Akerlof notes in describing a market in which buyers cannot
distinguish between good quality and bad quality: "The cost of dishonesty... lies not
only in the amount by which the purchaser is cheated; the cost also must include the loss
incurred from driving legitimate business out of existence." Akerlof, supra note 118,
at 495.
241. Cf. WEISBROD, supra note 18, at 13 (footnote omitted):
Whenever any nonprofit is found to have abused its trusted position, the
reputation of trustworthy nonprofits also suffers; the value of nonprofit status
as a signal that the organization deserves contributions of money or time is
debased. Nonprofits that do not act opportunistically, as well as those that do,
will find it increasingly difficult to obtain resources and will tend to be driven
out of the market. In the end the nonprofit market for trust-type services can
disappear.
Weisbrod then describes the debasement process, citing to Akerlof, supra note 118. Id.
at 13-14.
242. See Pamela Taulbee, Outcomes Management: Buying Value and Cutting Costs,
9 Bus. & HEALTH 28, 28 (Mar. 1991).
243. Dean Clark views the market operations of nonprofit hospitals as so wasteful
and duplicative that he proposes government centralization of the whole subsector:
The great number of nonprofit hospitals and the diversity of their quasigovernmental programs makes extremely difficult, if not impossible, the
rational, comprehensive, coordinated planning of health care policy by actual
governments. The great complexity and disruption caused by thousands of
nonprofit hospitals each pursuing its own vision of the social good, and the
great imperfections in the medical care market, combine to create a pressing
need for a strong, comprehensive, and coordinated governmental policy....
Although I accept the argument for decentralization in general, it is inapposite
to the health care system, which has become a gargantuan sector of the
economy whose growth rate is out of control.
Clark, supranote 238, at 1469 (footnote omitted).
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produces. 2' Perhaps, with our belief that the nonprofit sector reflects
diversity and multiplicity, we also hope that two nonprofit providers in a
community are really offering different services that in some way respond
to the public's demands.245
D. Summary of How Firms Operate
In this part, we peered inside the black box of firm operations.
Because of internal principal-agent problems, we saw that in for-profit
firms, a professionalized management often controls the board of directors
rather than the other way around. Similar agency problems run down
through the corporate hierarchy. Rather than operating to maximize
profits, businesses often exhibit organizational slack and productive
inefficiencies as a result of compromising competing goals within the
organization.
Similar forces operate within the nonprofit firm. Rather than
operating to maximize the donor's or client's welfare, nonprofits might
use the patron's funds to cross-subsidize other activities, to provide "too
much" quality, or simply, once again, to make a comfortable working
environment. Because the standard economic account of the nonprofit
sector presumes information asymmetry, the theory cannot explain why
patrons are satisfied dealing with nonprofits in general or, more
practically, how patrons should choose between competing nonprofits.

244. HALL, supra note 127, at 92 (using the 1889 phrase of Andrew Carnegie).
245. Ironically, we can even find a great deal of "competition" and "diversity" in
the public sector. Our federal system contains many governments; and, within the
federal government and among states and their subdivisions, we actually have competing
agencies and governments. For a resource-dependent social-service charity-which
means most of them-the multiplicity of government programs can lead to conflicts
between the demands of grantors, inducing the charity to deliberately blur its goals. This
obviously produces difficulties in assessing the effectiveness of the charity's operations.
Cf., e.g., Rose-Ackerman, supra note 239, at 327-28 n.18 (original source omitted):
A charity may also have more bargaining power in dealing with one
government agency if it also deals with several others. . . . Conflicting
quality-control requirements may give managers freedom of action instead of
forcing them to specialize. For example, a report on the Jewish Vocational
Service in Milwaukee noted that it 'has 13 federal, state and local funding
sources, so many, in fact, that auditors appear to be having trouble
unscrambling them all'.... This pattern of multiple funding sources is
common in the provision of social services.
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IV. EXTERNAL CONSTRAINTS: ACCOUNTABILITY
OR RESOURCE DEPENDENCE?
"Accountability" is the mechanism by which the agent answers to the
principal. In the business sector, managers must account to equity
owners. This sections examines the extent to which we can find
substitutes for equity owners in the nonprofit sector. In particular, we
concentrate on those who donate funds and time to the nonprofit. We see,
however, that because of the separation of supply from the beneficiary's
demand, donors of money and labor can often make poor substitutes for
equity ownership. Because benefactors, for reasons of their own, can
oversupply some activities and undersupply others, endowing benefactors
with the accountability entitlement will not produce the same benefits that
we achieve in endowing shareholders with accountability over profits.
This Article cannot, however, answer the normative question: Who
are the "principals" to whom society wants the charity to answer-in some
way greater than the usual demands of resource dependency? If we can
identify principals, we can then ask the subsequent question of how to
align the interests of the charity with the interests of the principals, be
they donors, clients/patrons/customers,
government contractors,
professional staff, or workers/volunteers. The discussion in the second
half of this Part IV considers each of these candidate categories in turn.
Before reaching that discussion, though, we must first consider the
implications to the charity of living in a complex environment, in which
its various constituencies all require response to their often conflicting
demands.
To begin on a cautionary note, we must remember that
"effectiveness" in satisfying constituents is not necessarily the same thing
as "efficiency." Jeffrey Pfeffer and Gerald Salancik give a wonderful
illustration of this distinction:
In the late 1960s, Governor Ronald Reagan of California curtailed
the amount of money going to the state university system. He
was concerned that state university campuses, particularly
Berkeley, were indoctrinating students in radical, left-wing ideas.
In response to these political pressures and to forestall further
budget cuts, the administrators attempted to demonstrate that they
were educating students at an even lower cost per student. Not
surprisingly, this argument had little impact on the governor;
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indeed, it missed the point of his criticism.

Producing

revolutionaries at lower cost was not what the governor wanted
246

One academic in the field of nonprofit management identifies four

types of accountability.247

"Compliance accountability" means having

to follow requirements imposed by law (such as tax and state filings) and

by contract. 4"

"Negotiated accountability" comes about through a

"negotiation" between the nonprofit and its environment as the charity
deals with loosely defined societal values and beliefs and political trends
(for example, some hospitals and universities make payments in lieu of
"Professional/discretionary accountability"
local property taxes).249
reflects the industry wide performance standards of professionals working

for

(or

volunteering

"anticipatory/positioning

for)

the

organization. 25

accountability"

acknowledges

Finally,
that

the

organization can anticipate future compliance standards, and might even
seek "to play a meaningful proactive role in shaping and defining the

standards" by lobbying for certain policies and practices. 2

This Part focuses more on the influences of compliance accountability

and professional accountability, leaving the other forms for another day.
We first examine the general question of resource dependency, and how
246. PFEFFER & SALANCIK, supra note 43, at 12. For a more recent example of
donor clout, see Fall Out, ECONOMIST, Feb. 4, 1995, at 78, 78-79 (discussing how the
Smithsonian Institution, a nonprofit organization that depends on the federal government
for 80% of its support, drastically altered its planned exhibition commemorating the
fiftieth anniversary of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki).
247. Kevin P. Kearns, The Strategic Management of Accountability in Nonprofit
Organizations:An Analytical Framework, 54 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 185 (1994).
248. Id. at 188. The Financial Accounting Standards Board ("FASB") recently
issued new rules requiring all nonprofits to report their financial activities with greater
conformity; these rules govern financial statements and accounting for contributions
received and made. See Andrew S. Lang & Wayne Berson, New PronouncementsAffect
Associations' FinancialReporting, Ass'N MGMT., Jan. 1994, at 37, 37. Charities resent
one change requiring them to report all pledges received as revenues; charities would
rather wait until collection to avoid the embarrassment of "having either to shake down
donors or suffer a write-off." Alison Leigh Cowan, New Accounting ProposalsCreate
Nonprofit Anxiety, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 1990, § 3, at 10.
249. Kearns, supra note 247, at 188-89.
250. Id. at 189.
251. Id. From a different perspective, consider a management article illustrating
how a charity that cannot mold to the environment can instead mold the environment to
itself: "For example, an adolescent drug treatment agency can seek regulatory legislation
to prevent competition from a for-profit drug treatment organization." Heimovics &
Herman, supra note 148, at 302.
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the presence of outside constituents compounds the organization's already
existing desire, discussed in Part III, to adopt fuzzy goals. Obviously,
multiple, unclear, or even conflicting goals complicate efforts at
accountability. In examining certain types of nonprofit resources in more
detail, we see the limits of donor, volunteer, and professional oversight.
In many cases, nonprofits struggle with many of the same environmental
concerns as proprietary businesses do, and external factors influence
nonprofit behavior to a greater degree than mere organizational form does.
Perhaps surprisingly, the nonprofit's constituents might not want an
active accountability role. Often, sources of support seem to recognize the
conflicts under which the nonprofit labors: "Accrediting agencies, boards
of trustees, government agencies, and individuals accept ceremonially at
face value the credentials, ambiguous goals, and categorical evaluations
that are characteristic of ceremonial organizations." 2 To look too
closely might upset the accommodation that the parties have reached. 3
A. Resource Dependency: Goal Setting and Measuring Success
Once management experts plunged into the black box of the firm, they
sometimes forgot that many factors crucial to the success of the firm exist
outside its boundaries. 4 Indeed, the role of management is often
symbolic, with managers able to control and influence only a small part
of the firm's output. 55 In addition, the output of nonprofits is often
hard to measure because quality is often subjective. Finally, the quest of
nonprofits to "do good"-the assessment of which involves "societal
values about which there may be little or no consensus"-adds another
layer of measurement difficulty. 6
252. John W. Meyer & Brian Rowan, Institutionalized Organizations:Formal

Structure as Myth and Ceremony, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM, supranote 48, at 41,
60.
253. Id. (stating that these "external constituents are themselves likely to be
corporately organized agents of society. Maintaining categorical relationships with their

organizational subunits is more stable and more certain than is relying on inspection and
control.").
254. See PFEFFER & SALANCIK, supra note 43, at 258 ("Somehow, the things to be
managed are usually within the organization, assumed to be under its control ....
When authors get down to the task of describing the running of the organization, the
relevance of the environment fades.").
255. Id. at 16-19. Professors Pfeffer and Salancik refer to the phenomenon of firing
baseball managers as a form of scapegoating, the symbolic method of assigning blame.
256. Rosabeth Moss Kanter & David V. Summers, Doing Well while Doing Good:
Dilemmas of PerformanceMeasurement in Nonprofit Organizationsand the Needfor a
Multiple-Constituency Approach, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, supra note 17, at 154,
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What outside forces uniquely influence how the nonprofit is run?
After all, business firms also suffer under many of the same constraints,
such as the demands of workers, suppliers, creditors, lessors, and
customers-and from competition from other firms. Nonprofits, of
course, have no source of equity capital, but many do rely, in varying
It can make a difference if
degrees, on donated property and time.'
the organization depends on a particular resource, such as a major grant
or alumni gift. Under the notion that "he who pays the piper calls the
tune," focusing on resource dependency brings together issues of
ownership, control and governance, accountability, and subsidy.
"Dependency does not just refer to material resources, but includes social
relations that involve legitimation, competition, or cooperation."5 8
As discussed in Part III above, organizations often keep goals fuzzy
in order to head off conflicting demands for accountability, or to mask
"Goals are made
differences of opinion, if not power struggles.
ambiguous or vacuous, and categorical ends are substituted for technical
ends. Hospitals treat, not cure, patients. Schools produce students, not
learning. In fact, data on technical performance are eliminated or
Similarly, "in museums one would expect
rendered invisible.""
conflict between wealthy lay trustees and ambitious career-minded
Similarly, modern hospital systems face "struggles
directors. " °
between community-oriented governing boards and super-specialist
physicians or between cost-conscious accountants and service-minded
caregivers."' In attempting to please all, the organization might permit
every constituency to believe that its claim has been granted. For
example, "if one inquires who decides which curricula will be taught in
schools, any number of parties from the various governments down to
individual teachers may say that they decide."262 However, these
differences of philosophy are often no more right or wrong than the
154.

257. See supra note 50.
258. Neil Fligstein, The Structural Transformation of American Industry: An

InstitutionalAccount of the Causes of Diversificationin the Largest Firms, 1919-1979,
in THE NEW INsTITUTIoNALISM, supra note 48, at 311, 313.
259. Meyer & Rowan, supra note 252, at 57.
260. HALL, supra note 127, at 210. This conflict provides much material for the

high-society story-teller Louis Auchincloss. See, e.g., Louis AUCHINCLOSS, The
FoundationGrant, in THE PARTNERS 218 (1974) (in which the curator rails at the board
chairman: "Museums are for board members, for prestige, for puffs, for status, are they
not? Imagine a man so low as to care enough about a few miserable artifacts as to

a crime for beauty[!]").
commit a crime for them ....
261. HALL, supra note 127, at 210.
262. Meyer & Rowan, supra note 252, at 56.

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REWEW

[Vol. 40

decision by a business corporation to reinvest earnings, to the
disappointment of those shareholders desiring current dividends.263
Management expert Rosabeth Moss Kanter is not troubled by goal
conflicts. Indeed, she notes that recent organizational models "have
moved away from rationalistic and voluntaristic assumptions about goal
consensus, unity of purpose, and the possibility of discovering universal
performance standards."6 As she observes: "Multiple constituencies
and multiple environments require multiple measures."'
In simpler times, resource dependency presented no institutional
conflicts: local charities were funded from one source, the resident
church.'
With the adoption in 1601 of the Statute of Charitable

Uses, 7 the British institution of noblesse oblige induced elites to
finance private philanthropy-and to control how that philanthropy was
conducted.'
Now, as charities hunt for cash, 9 they encounter
conflicts between the expectations of their various income constituents.
Charity managers today often indulge in the pipe dream of "independence"
263. Nonprofits, however, often face common problems related to their constant
shortage of operating funds and to the inexperience of volunteers-including, if not most
damaging, volunteer board members from the business community. Peter Dobkin Hall
spins out a long, involved hypothetical of the "Widget Museum," reflecting the clash of
cultures between the nonprofit and business worlds, followed by comment: "When the
Widget Museum case was first presented to a group that included nonprofit staffers,
trustees, and corporate contributions officers, most of them thought that the unidentified
organization was one with which they had been connected in the recent past." HALL,
supra note 127, at 216 (the "widget museum" hypothetical appears at pages 211-219).
He finds that "the rules governing nonprofit behavior become personalized, informal, and
folkloric; the signposts demarcating the boundaries between for-profit and nonprofit
obligations become effaced; and the stage is set for organizational conflict." Id. at 218.
264. Kanter & Summers, supra note 256, at 158.
265. Id.
266. MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, FOUNDATIONS AND GOVERNMENT 14-18 (1965)
(discussing the charitable activities of the Catholic Church, Islam, and the Church of
England).
267. Id. at 23.
268. See THERESA ODENDAHL, CHARITY BEGINS AT HOME: GENEROSITY AND
SELF-INTEREST AMONG THE PHILANTHROPIC ELITE 10 (1990).
269. Cyril F. Chang & Howard P. Tuckman, FinancialVulnerability andAttrition
as Measures of Nonprofit Performance, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR IN THE MIXED
ECONOMY, supra note 100, at 163, 168-70, 172 (finding that 40% of nonprofits are
vulnerable in at least one of four criteria: inadequate equity, revenue concentration,
already low administrative costs, and thin operating margins).
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from their donors-of having a sufficient endowment to produce all the
income they need. 70

Having to account for one's actions requires one to think about them
harder: to be more analytic, to take longer to reach a decision, and to
devote more resources to the process. This effort is both productive and
For better
to some degree counterproductive (the "dilution effect")."
or for worse, though, what managers decide depends on who is evaluating
"If decision makers
their performance, and on what measures.'
be most favorably
that
would
option
the
identified
they
have
that
believe
evaluated by others, they tend to adopt that position."273 This strategic
behavior occurs because accountable decision-makers seek favorable
evaluations and low criticism.274 The process of pleasing changes the
270. See, e.g., Tuckman & Chang, supra note 142, at 79 (citation omitted):
[F]und accumulations offer decisionmakers a measure of independence from
their donors. Nonprofits usually must respond to donor preferences if they
wish to obtain gifts and bequests. Those that rely on program service revenues
are dependent on the satisfaction of those who purchase the services, while
those that seek government grants must meet specific requirements of the
grantor.... Moreover, in markets where nonprofits compete, large equity
balances have strategic value, because they improve competitive position and
help to create a barrier against entry by potential competitors.
271. See William F. Messier, Jr. & William C. Quilliam, The Effect of
Accountability on Judgment: Development of Hypothesesfor Auditing, 11 AUDITING: J.
PRAc. & THEORY 123, 129, 132-33 (Supp. 1992). "The use of analytical processing will
be even more pronounced when the decision is irreversible, significant, complex,
ambiguous, and/or unstable." Id. at 129 (citation omitted).
272. See Robert D. Hayes & James A. Millar, MeasuringProductionEfficiency in
a Not-For-ProfitSetting, 65 ACCT. REv. 505, 506 (1990).
273. Itamar Simonson & Peter Nye, The Effect of Accountability on Susceptibility
to Decision Errors, 51 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 416, 417 (1992).
See also Philip E. Tetlock, Accountability and the Complexity of Thought, 45 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 74 (1983) (describing an experiment to measure
cognitive effort, in which the subjects were told of their audience's views (as either
liberal, conservative, or unknown)). Subjects justifying to a liberal (conservative)
audience reported liberal (conservative) attitudes, hoping to win social approval by
conforming; but subjects expecting to justify to an audience with unknown views
exhibited more multidimensional, self-critical, and complex analytic processing, and still
tried to discover an acceptable response. See also Simonson & Nye, supra, at 418. See
generally Philip E. Teflock, The Impact of Accountability on Judgment and Choice:
Toward a Social Contingency Model, in 25 ADvANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 331 (Mark P. Zanna ed., 1992).
274. Simonson & Nye, supra note 273, at 441; see also Canice Prendergast, A
Theory of "Yes Men," 83 AM. ECON. REV. 757, 758 (1993) (noting that when workers
will be evaluated subjectively, they will "attempt to second-guess the opinions of their
monitor and mimic them").
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product; in many cases, that is exactly what a business person, schooled
Even an
in consumer sovereignty, would want to see happen.27
independent auditor is accountable to his client, subject to the same
pressures; the most important aspect of professional judgment by the
practicing auditors "was that the decision could be justified. "276
The demand for measurable goals in the service sector also leads to
an "A"-for-effort approach. Substituting "effectiveness criteria" for goals
can produce de facto quotas. 2' Moreover, if charities survive and are
judged merely by the level of clients they serve, the charities come to
have a vested interest in preserving the status quo. John O'Looney
discusses the difficulty of building incentives for preventive action into
purchase-of-service contracting: "In fact, many observers suggest that
private delivery systems have a perverse incentive to maintain problems
at some level in order to maintain demand." 278 However, a primary
goal of survival can cause nonprofits to "lose sight of other purposes,
including their reasons for existing in the first place."279 Ironically,
"[s]ince nonprofits tend to believe in their own functioning, failure to
275. See, e.g., Grant Wiggens, Accountability, Testing, and Schools: TowardLocal
Responsibility andAway from Change by Mandate, 36 Bus. HORIZONS at 13, 13 (1993)
("Accountability depends on the freedom to succeed or fail based on client satisfaction.
...A 'command' system failed in all of Eastern Europe in economics; why then is such
a system likely to work in education?").
276. Messier & Quilliam, supra note 271, at 124 ("Additionally, the researchers
found that auditors tend to make a decision early in the judgment process, suggesting that
much of the information search ... is to provide justification for the decision.").
277. Worse, specific goals, rather than serving as minimally acceptable standards,
can result in performance dropping to that level. Kanter & Summers, supra note 256,
at 156.
278. O'Looney, supranote 147, at 513. But compare the March of Dimes, which
had raised millions in the fight against polio; after the eradication of that disease in the
1950s, the March of Dimes successfully reoriented itself into a campaigner against all
birth defects. Founded by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, the National Foundation for
Infant Paralysis raised millions to fight the polio epidemics of the 1950s. Its successful
small-change campaigns inspired its new name, the March of Dimes Birth Defects
Foundation. See, e.g., Molly O'Neill, Learning to Turn Dimes Into Millions, N.Y.
TIMEs, Oct. 17, 1990, at Cl; see generally Walter W. Powell & Rebecca Friedkin,
OrganizationalChange in Nonprofit Organizations,in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, supra
note 17, at 180, 186-87 (comparing organizations that successfully transformed, such as
the March of Dimes and the Young Men's Christian Association, with those that failed,
such as the Women's Christian Temperance Union).
279. Kanter & Summers, supra note 256, at 158.
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achieve goals is taken not as a sign of weakness in the organization but as
a sign that efforts should be intensified."'
Again, however, for-profit firms similarly suffer from internal and
external conflicts. In particular, the growing service subsector of the
proprietary economy presents the same challenges of setting quality
standards and measuring success."
Thus, both proprietary and
nonprofit firms must still figure out how to make the most effective use
of their resources.
The question is whether substituting different
constituencies, such as donors or volunteers, for shareholders alters who
determines which goals to pursue. To this question we now turn.
B. Nonprofit Constituents
In looking at specific types of resource dependency, we begin by
examining and contrasting donors, clients/patrons/customers, and
governments as bestowers of contracts or grants. We then conclude this
section on accountability by examining the oversight provided by
professionals and by volunteers.
1. Donors
Recall our hypothetical of Scrooge, endowing a trust to distribute
Christmas turkeys to the poor. The law permits a charitable trust to
continue in perpetuity as a stark exception to the normal rule prohibiting
control over property from the grave. Indeed, in its original usage, the
legal term "dead hand" referred to the hand of the trustee, not of the
testator, because the trustee cannot exercise discretion.'
Generally, so
long as the trust benefits an indefinite class, the law considers the trust to
have a public benefit, no matter how unimportant or narrow the settlor's
280. Id. at 164; cf Donald R. Carlson & George B. Shepherd, Cartelon Campus:
The Economics andLaw of Academic Institutions' FinancialAid Price-Fixing,71 OR. L.
REV. 563, 580 n.46 (1992) (pointing out that after Stanford was accused by the federal
government of waste and wrong-doing, its alumni contributions increased-perhapsas
a show of faith in the alma mater, but perhaps instead on the assumption that government
oversight will reduce future X-inefficiency).
281. See The ManufacturingMyth, ECONOMIST, Mar. 19, 1994, at 91, 91: "In 1970
27% of America's workers were in manufacturing; by 1993 the figure had fallen to 16%.
Meanwhile, services' share had climbed from 66% to 78%." (Presumably these numbers
include those who work in the nonprofit sector.). See also Slow Service?, ECONOMIST,
Mar. 19, 1994, at 92, 92 ("[A] large part of the true increase in the output of many
services takes the form of increases in their quality ....
Because service companies can
charge higher prices for higher-quality services, improvements in quality may be
misinterpreted as price increases.").
282. LEWIS M. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 2 (1955).
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purpose.'

That is, the law does not require the grant to be

efficient.'
Moving beyond the world of a single donor to a charity seeking
support from the general public, Avner Ben-Ner and Benedetto Gui argue

that it is in the very nature of a nonprofit organization to cede control to
"key high-demand stakeholders."'

For example, Michael Krashinsky

describes the "community" that exists between universities and their
alumni: "alumni take pride in the athletic and scientific accomplishments
of their schools; alumni send their children back to their old schools as a

way of continuing an intimate involvement in that community; alumni
return for reunions and join alumni clubs in other cities. " 6
Frequently, however, we also find that institutional beliefs clash with

economic needs.'

Today's charity faces competition from myriad

other charities, and high fund-raising and administrative costs.

28

At the

283. Consider the Buck trust, which endowed a $447 million trust for the exclusive
benefit of Marin County, California, one of the richest counties in the country; its initial
trustee unsuccessfully sought court permission to make expenditures throughout the San
Francisco Bay area. See ODENDAHL, supra note 268, at 10.
284. See, e.g., Chang & Tuckman, supra note 269, at 166 (describing the social and
political impediments to efficient delivery of services through nonprofits).
285. Ben-Ner & Gui, supra note 100, at 1, 8 n.5 ("Because the existence of a
nonprofit organization is predicated on demand-side stakeholders' revelation of
preferences and voluntary price discrimination, any nonprofit entrepreneur must
cooperate with key high-demand stakeholders and de facto make them controlling
stakeholders.").
286. Michael Krashinsky, Transaction Costs and a Theory of the Nonprofit
Organization, in THE ECONOMICS OF NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS, supra note 99, at 114,

127 (footnote omitted). For a less sanguine view of alumni, whose children in the
aggregate are twice as likely to be admitted to Harvard or Yale as unconnected
applicants, see John D. Lamb, Note, The Real Affirmative Action Babies: Legacy
Preferencesat Harvardand Yale, 26 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 491,499,506 (1993).
Harvard defended this preference, in information supplied to the U.S. Office for Civil
Rights (OCR), on three grounds: "to 1) encourage alumni volunteer services; 2)
encourage alumni financial contributions; and, 3) maintain community relations." Id. at
509 (original source omitted). "Additionally, Harvard asserted, and OCR accept[ed],
that there are no alternatives to these preferences that could effectively accomplish the
same legitimate goals." Id. (original source omitted).
287. See generally Brody, supra note 5.
288. See Steinberg, supra note 144. See also James M. Buchanan, Rent Seeking,
Noncompensated Transfers, and the Laws of Succession, 26 J.L. & ECON. 71 (1983),
whose discussion of potential heirs' efforts to obtain inheritances could be extended to
efforts by charities to compete for donations: "Profit seeking ...as a process, creates
value in itself. By contrast, rent seeking is socially inefficient because the process in
itself creates no value while utilizing scarce resources ....

[A]ny value that is to be
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same time, the public seems jaded with social problems;' uninterested
in supporting monolithic organizations ("We all have to remember that
people don't support organizations, they support causes."29); and
uneducated about the fiscal needs of charities (many people express
surprise that "managers at nonprofits are paid at all" 291) and their
productive demands ("This is not an amateur undertaking. We try to tell
people about the kind of professionalism that's needed."291). A public
ignorant of cost constraints cannot perform effective oversight.2'
Where a nonprofit seeks support from the general public, multiple
forces of institutional isomorphism (conformity) can transform the
enterprise, for both better and worse. Change might be imposed top
down, as in the development of the United Charities in the 1930s, which,
in the process of standardizing accounting practices, performance
evaluation, and reporting mechanisms, also homogenized structure,
method, and philosophy. 2'
Less deliberately, but just as completely,
"neighborhood organizations in urban communities, many of which are
committed to participatory democracy, are driven to developing
organizational hierarchies in order to gain support from more
hierarchically organized donor organizations."2 95
Donor control can be positively correlated with professionalism,
discussed below. One study of corporate grant-making in the Twin Cities
found a herd mentality in the behavior of corporate-giving officers, who
belonged to the same professional associations. Because they tended to
evaluate nonprofits similarly, "a system was being created whereby
different funders in the community, through their network contacts, could
transferred without compensation exists independently of the investment in attempts to
redirect its disposition." Id. at 83.
289. Skolnik, supra note 38, at 29.
290. Id. at 30 (quoting the public-relations vice president for the American Cancer

Society).
291. Id.
292. Id. (quoting the public-relations vice president for the American Cancer

Society).
293. See, e.g., id. at 29 ("Even the Girl Scouts of the USA have recently come

under fire for using too large a share of cookie-sale profits for administration, rather than
rebating them to the troops that made the sales.").

294. DiMaggio & Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited, supra note 48, at 68. After the
United Way of America salary scandal, United Way campaigns suffered serious shortfalls
in contributions; as a result several United Way affiliates imposed on charities desiring
funding mandatory reporting standards designed to quantify actual impacts and outcomes
of services. Bruce Millar, Allocating United Way Money to Charities: A Painstaking,
Often ControversialProcess, 5 CHRON. PHILANTHROPY 27, 27 (Jan. 12, 1993).
295. DiMaggio & Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited, supra note 48, at 68.
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come to some consensus as to which nonprofits should be funded and

which should not."' 96 Similarly, a historical study of nonprofit auditing
suggests that because merchants with business training also likely served
religious and political organizations, the audit technology developed in

18th century English companies found its way into the audit practices of
"The Society for Propagating the Gospel in Foreign Parts," the most
prominent religious-eleemosynary organization of the period. 2"

2. Clients/Patrons/Customers
What's the best law school in the country? Every March, as the latest
U.S. News & World Report annual survey makes its way through the

halls of the legal academies, you can hear, "What do you mean we're in
the third quartile?" or "How can they say we've slipped eight places in
one year?"298 The Clinton Administration proposes issuing "report
cards" on hospitals. 2' We already get mortality reports in some cases,
although the teaching hospitals claim that their numbers look worse
because they treat sicker patients. What else would be tabulated, and with

what explanations?
- 296. Joseph Galaskiewicz, Making Corporate Actors Accountable: InstitutionBuilding in Minneapolis-St. Paul,in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 48, at 293,
306. Moreover, this study
found that nonprofits tended to receive more corporate funding in toto, if a
larger number of corporate-giving professionals recognized and thought well
of them. This effect was independent of the nonprofits' expenditures, the
value of government grants and contracts, and the elite's use and/or service to
the nonprofits.
Id. Galaskiewicz was describing a study he conducted with Ronald Burt, which also
found that this "interorganization contagion" among corporate officers was stronger for
nonprofit organizations providing cultural services; the authors suggested that opinions
about culture, being more difficult to judge than health and welfare, depended more on
peer views. See Joseph Galaskiewicz & Ronald S. Burt, InterorganizationContagion in
CorporatePhilanthropy, 36 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 88, 103-04 (1991).
297. See, e.g., G.A. Swanson & John C. Gardner, Not-For-ProfitAccounting and
Auditing in the Early Eighteenth Century: Some Archival Evidence, 63 AccT. REV.436,
444 (1988).
298. See The Top 25Law Schools; The Second Tier; The Rest of the Rankings, U.S
NEws & WORLD REP., Mar. 18, 1996, at 82, 82-86.
299. Hilary Stout & Joe Davidson, Group of GOP Senators to Unveil Today Their
Own Plan to Reform Health Care, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 1993, at A3.
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The question of consumer sovereignty in the nonprofit field is a hot
topic3 ° One could almost demand accountability to the nonprofit's
customers on the ground that the nonprofit exists in the first place to
deliver a service that the proprietary sector will not deliver. However, we

cannot have it both ways.

If there really is information asymmetry,

consumers by definition cannot judge the "accounting" in any meaningful
way.3"' If, on the other hand, consumers can judge quality, we have
just overcome the economic need for a nonprofit sector (at least in this

particular industry).
To avoid paternalism, consumer sovereignty should be restricted as

little as possible.

However, if the nonprofit sector exists because of

information asymmetry (that is, the consumer cannot judge the medical,
educational, or other benefits), then what can we tell the consumer that
will minimize this asymmetry and permit rational choices between

nonprofits 3" (as well as between nonprofit and for-profit providers)? A
voucher is just cash with a stipulation attached that the holder must use it

only to buy services from an approved class of providers; the largest
voucher programs, such as food stamps and Medicaid, permit the holder
300. See, e.g., Theodore H. Poister & Gary T. Henry, Citizen Ratings of Public
and Private Service Quality: A Comparative Perspective, 54 PUB. ADMIN. REv. 155
(1994); Lea Aharony & Stephen Strasser, PatientSatisfaction: What We Know About and
What We Still Need to Explore, 50 MED. CARE REv. 49 (1993); Eugene C. Nelson, et
al., Do Patient Perceptions of Quality Relate to Hospital Financial Performance?,J.
HEALTH CARE MKTG. at 6 (Dee. 1992); Joel Brinkley, You Bet YourLife. Do You Know
the Odds?, N.Y. TIMEs, May 29, 1994, § 4, at 4; Michael L. Millenson, The Wonder
Drug of Information Makes Patients Insiders, CHI. TRIB., May 11, 1993, § 1, at 1;
Study: Kidney Transplant Can Be $682, or $87,629, CHI. TRIB., June 24, 1993, § 1, at
16; Ron Winslow, Health-CareReport CardsAre Getting Low GradesFrom Some Focus
Groups, WALL ST. J., May 19, 1994, at BI.
301. Several studies of the nursing home industry found that for-profit nursing

homes, which charge lower prices, attract residents who have relatives or other monitors,
and so do not need to trust a nonprofit to provide higher quality. See, e.g., Weisbrod
& Schlesinger, supra note 150; Alphonse G. Holtmann & Steven G. Ullmann,
TransactionCosts, Uncertainty, And Not-For-ProfitOrganizations:The Case of Nursing
Homes, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR IN THE MIXED ECONOMY, supra note 100, at 149,

149.
302. See, e.g., Carlson& Shepherd, supranote 280, at 587-88 (universities compete
on the basis of inefficient, but highly visible, "amenities," such as "elegant dormitories,
classrooms, and athletic facilities; fancy food; elaborate recreational opportunities; and
extensive medical and counseling services").
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to go to a government, private proprietary or private nonprofit provider,
with no assistance to consumers in making choices. 33
Let us return to the threshold question. If the only feature missing
from the marketplace is trust, then why not just have nonprofit brokers?
For example, if individual consumers find it time-consuming and
expensive to research the best hospital, why is it not enough that a
nonprofit organization studies, evaluates and ranks (for-profit)
hospitals?"' What public good results from nonprofit production as
opposed to nonprofit monitoring?
Consider the following assertion by Michael Krashinsky, who
advocates nonprofit provision as a remedy for the inadequacy of
regulatory efforts towards quality production:
[A] knowledgeable day-care inspector usually can tell quickly
whether a center is providing quality care for children. But this
judgment is based upon a sensitivity to the dynamics of the
relationships between children and care-givers. Since these can
hardly be specified in the regulations, the licensing requirements
usually focus on physical aspects of the center itself (floor space,
bathrooms, windows, etc.) and on the number and training of
those providing the care. In areas like this, regulation will not be
entirely satisfactory and nonprofit organizations, with all their
inefficiencies, become a viable alternative.3 5
Krashinsky's most telling statement is that while quality day-care might
not be measurable in terms of inputs, it is observable. As a matter of
organizational form, why do we need nonprofit day-care centers when we
can have private nonprofit inspection of proprietary day-care centers?
(Indeed, day-care is only one of many industries in which both business
and nonprofit suppliers exist.)
Proprietary organizations might voluntarily seek nonprofit "Good
Housekeeping" seals of approval out of competitive self-interest. A
303. C. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Social Services and the Market, 83 COLUM. L.

REV. 1405, 1406, 1420 (1983) ("Proxy shopping"-paying for services for the needy if
the provider has a high enough percentage of unsubsidized clients-"can be superior to

a voucher plan when the needy are less effective shoppers than are unsubsidized
customers.").
304. Of course, there is the Consumers Union, a nonprofit established in 1936 "to
provide consumers with information and advice on goods, services, health, and personal

finance"; it refuses permission for the product reviews in its magazine, Consumer
Reports, to "be used in advertising or for any other commercial purpose." About
Consumers Union, 59 CONSUMER REP. 139 (1994).
305. Krashinsky, supra note 286, at 124.
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related form of oversight is accreditation.

Organizations have some

discretion in orienting themselves towards particular types of validating

authority: "Organizations must determine with which, if any, external
sponsors to connect."106

Of course, brokering brings its own problems.

7

An organization

seeking accreditation might make major structural sacrifices, perhaps

reflecting a power struggle over the accreditation body itself.0 8 For
example,

in order to obtain accreditation by the American Bar

Association, a law school must meet several objective standards, not all

of which bear on quality of education. 3"
Services like the Better
Business Bureau and the National Charities Information Bureau, which
rate the "worthiness" of donee charities, also adopt objective, and so often
unhelpful, standards, such as percentage limits on how much the

organization spends on fund-raising." 0

306. W. Richard Scott, Unpacking Institutional Arguments, in THE NEW
supra note 48, at 164, 176.
307. See generally the 11 -article symposium, PrivateAccreditationin the Regulatory
State, and in particular, the first article, Forward:The Place of Private Accrediting
Among the Instruments of Government, edited by Clark C. Havighurst, in 57 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1994).
308. See, e.g., Steven Morris, Watchdog DrawsHowls, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 20, 1995,
at C1 (describing how hospitals protest the decision by the largest hospital accreditor, the
Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, to begin selling formerly
confidential hospital surveys to patients, their employers, insurers-and their
competitors).
309. See 1 MSL L. REv. (Winter 1994) (volume devoted to the Massachusetts
School of Law's antitrust suit against the A.B.A., whose accreditation is a requirement
in most states for a school's graduate to sit for the bar exam); see also Edward A.
Abrams, Justice DepartmentBalks at ABA Accrediting Changes, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 22,
1996, at 1 (reviewing consent decree reached by the Justice Department and the ABA,
to be subject to an approval hearing by Judge Richey on June 19, 1996).
310. The National Charities Information Bureau, in rating charities, imposes
minimum standards that include an independent board, a clear statement of purpose,
detailed budgets, and good cost control-and, for established charities, a 40% limit on
fund-raising and other administrative costs. See Alison L. Cowan, The Gadfly Who
Audits Philanthropy, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1990, § 3, at 9. For example, the bureau
determined that Mothers Against Drunk Driving should have allocated 77% of its receipts
to fund-raising, rather than the 35% it allocated (because the organization included
information on drunk driving in its fund-raising solicitation, MADD classified much of
its mailing costs as program expense). Id. The NCIB was formed in 1918 "to help the
American public deal with a profusion of war-relief efforts"; in the early 1970's the
Better Business Bureau began offering similar services through its Philanthropic Advisory
Services. Id.
INSTITUTIONALISM,
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And why should even the brokers be nonprofit?3" Information is
a product that is often marketed by proprietary purveyors; competition
accounts for an acceptable level of trustworthiness. Think of newspapers,
which (usually) are proprietary. If a proprietary news vendor desires
credibility, self-interest dictates disclosing its biases and affiliations;
reputation is an important device in overcoming transaction costs.
In the largest industry in which nonprofits dominate-hospitalsconsumers happily employ a for-profit broker, namely the doctors
themselves. Patients cannot simply check into their local trustworthy
nonprofit hospital; rather, they must have a doctor with staff privileges
admit them.3" 2 If it takes a nonprofit motive to earn trust, why has the
demand for physician choice dominated the debate over health care cost
containment? Why does Medicare, essentially a voucher system, pay for
medical services from private (proprietary) doctors? Moreover, a great
deal of policing is also conducted by for-profit insurance companies (as
third-party payers of employer-sponsored health plans).

311. Governments can also perform this monitoring role, but apparently the
government often does business only with nonprofits because it has trouble judging
output! See James, Comments, supra note 99, at 157 ("[G]overnment subsidies can be
diverted from their original intent just as private donations can. Thus, requirements
tying subsidies to [nonprofit-organization] status may not always be well-founded.").
312. One question recently studied is whether an admitting physician behaves more
like an employee or more like a consumer. Lawton R. Burns & Douglas R. Wholey,
FactorsAffecting Physician Loyalty and Exit: A Longitudinal Analysis of PhysicianHospitalRelationships, 27 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 1 (1992). Facing the end of the "good
old days," with the traditional cost-plus reimbursement pattern of third-party insurers,
hospitals want to induce physicians to admit more patients for shorter periods of time at
lower treatment costs. "Physician-hospital interdependence has switched from a
symbiotic to a competitive basis ....
In response, hospitals are seeking ways to control
or influence their physicians' utilization behavior and to integrate them more closely into
hospital affairs." Id. at 2 (citation omitted). This might, however, be a mistake. In a
county with eight nonfederal hospitals, the study found that most physicians are
extremely loyal to one or two hospitals (using the primary hospital between 72% and
95% of the time, and a secondary hospital between 8% and 16% of the time); that the
main reason for such loyalty was convenience (primarily proximity of the primary
hospital to the doctor's office) and inertia (average termination of only 13.4% of hospital
affiliations). Id. at 14-16. The authors describe as "both somewhat expected and
somewhat surprising" their findings "that physicians utilize hospitals not as loyal
employees but as loyal consumers purchasing services on their own (or their patients')
behalf." Id. at 19. This study leaves us with the unsettling notion that information
brokers such as doctors fall prey to habitualization like any other name-brand consumer.
If employees cannot provide oversight, and even the most highly educated consumer
cannot, nonprofit accountability suffers.
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3. Government Contracts/Grants
What are the side effects from government contracting-and
government standards-setting the market?3 13 The upside is that the
activity will be run in a manner specified by a sector accountable to a
broad constituency (unlike donors, who tend to be elitist and paternalistic).
The greater the government financial stake, the greater the remedy to
information asymmetry. The downside, though, is we get only one flavor
of certified service. That is, the more the government seeks to impose
standards and practices, the less society enjoys the claimed benefits of
heterogeneity that are supposed to be the hallmark of the nonprofit sector.
For example, John O'Looney observes that "tight-coupling" can be
achieved through control of funding streams or budget authority, and
through rules specifying technology and standards. However, "[e]ach of
these mechanisms tends to change the character of the model and in cases
of detailed, comprehensive regulation tends to blur the distinction between

public and private provision. "314

Moreover, if programmatic authority is not also centralized, control
For
effectively devolves to financial officers and accountants.3 15
example, where school funding is tied to attendance data or hospital
reimbursement is based on measurable indicators of patient care,
"[f]unding decisions do not directly prescribe programmatic and
instrumental decisions but create pressures and place constraints on them
and, in the limiting case, can virtually determine them."36
Not only is the nonprofit subject to review of its government contract
performance, but it is also, in many cases, subject to review by
government auditors;3" 7 recall the scandal over Stanford University's
313. See generally SMITH & LIPSKY, supra note 149.
314. O'Looney, supra note 147, at 516.
315. W. Richard Scott & John W. Meyer, The Organization of Societal Sectors:
PropositionsandEarlyEvidence, in THE NEW INSTITuTIONALISM, supra note 48, at 108,

130.
316. Id. at 131.
317. Thomas A. Lemmer & Paul E. Pompeo, "Educating" Lawyers about the

Implications of Cost Accounting Standardsfor Government Contracts and Grants with

EducationalInstitutions, 21 J.C. & U.L. 111 (1994); Cf. BOZEMAN, supra note 219, at
75 (describing how a Defense Department contractor "now may become an object of
attention of congressional watchdogs and may be called upon to testify at congressional
and executive budget proceedings.").
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government contracting cost allocations."'
In addition, the federal
government often conditions a grant on conformance to government
personnel standards. "Universities (including private universities) are
particularly vulnerable, because it is legally possible to withhold all federal
money from a university because a single department or even a single
project has been found in violation of affirmative action guidelines.""'
Finally, should a nonprofit depend for its funding on a single
government contract (or a few), accountability may be high, but security
is not. In addition to the normal vicissitudes of its market, such a
nonprofit now bears the risk that changes in the political climate might
threaten its funding program or even the entire government agency on
which it relies.
In sum, the more the nonprofit depends on the public sector, the more
the nonprofit metamorphoses into a de facto government enterprise.
4. Managerial and Staff Professionalism
Professionalism exists at the management level as well as at the board
level, and the increasing professionalism of lower classes of employees
marks the nonprofit sector. In recent years we have witnessed a
revolution in the degree to which nonprofits accept, and are demanding,
to act in a more "business-like" way, often due to pressures from
resources on which the charity depends."' Pressure also comes from
the ranks of managers themselves, and from educational institutions
" '
offering management training. 32
Paul DiMaggio finds the nonprofit
sector particularly receptive to administrative professionalism because of
"the affinity between the legitimizing accounts of professionals and of
318. See Navy, Stanford Settle Dispute Over Charges, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 19, 1994,
§ 1, at 18 (recounting that Stanford paid a total of over $3 million in settlement of
erroneous overcharges, "including flowers for the president's home"; the Navy found no

wrongdoing by the university).

319. BOZEMAN, supra note 219, at 102.
320. A professional with seemingly transferable skills from one particular field

might impose his profession's norms on the organization. For example, "certain
corporate strategies were favored by CEOs with marketing and finance backgrounds

because the strategies fit their interests and competencies.. . . [Museum professionals]

sought radical changes in museum missions and policies that would tend to enhance their
own positions relative to those of their trustees." Powell & DiMaggio, supra note 58,

at 1, 31. In these cases, "advocates of change drew on institutionalized models and
employed highly legitimate and stylized accounts, which we have no reason to doubt they
believed, to advance their positions. But the options favored and terms of the debate

bore a decided affinity to the interests of the participants." Id. at 31.

321. See EDUCATING MANAGERS OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS (Michael O'Neill

& Dennis R. Young eds., 1988); see also Heimovics & Herman, supra note 148, at 295.
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nonprofit organizations-both based on claims to expertise, a service
ethos, and disinterest in pecuniary gain.""n However, a professional

can experience conflict between her duties to "the profession" and her

duties to her organization. 3"

As mentioned in Part III, professionalism creates guilds which supply
a common ethos and standards of practice, a superstructure that cuts

across firms. According to Peter Dobkin Hall, however, the increasing

professionalism of nonprofit managers is viewed by some as "a sort of
Trojan horse"; managerial professionalism has tended to shift policy
making from the governing board to the staff.324 Eventually, boundary-

spanning activities by the manager can "fundamentally alter the direction
of an institution, the composition of its board, and the nature of its

membership.""

If professionalism takes root in a particular field, the

state might legitimate the profession with legally required licenses and

practices,326 transforming
industry.

the

organizations

operating

within

the

Managerial training is "professionalized" by becoming increasingly
rigorous and more formalized. Moreover, managers carrying out similar
activities in different firms not only attended the same schools but also
"read the same journals and joined the same associations. They had an

approach to their work that was closer to that of lawyers, doctors, and
ministers than that of the owners and managers of small traditional
322. Paul J. DiMaggio, Constructing an OrganizationalField as a Professional
Project: U.S. Art Museums, 1920-1940, in THE NEW INSTrrUTIoNALISM, supra note 48,

at 267, 288.
323. Compare the case of the in-house lawyer. See Grace M. Giesel, The Ethics
or Employment Dilemma of In-House Counsel, 5 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICs 535 (1992);
Seymour Moskowitz, Employment-At-Will & Codes of Ethics: The Professional's
Dilemma, 23 VAL. U. L. REV. 33 (1988). A "recent survey indicates that more than 10
percent of all lawyers in the United States are employed in-house by corporations."
General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487, 491 (Cal. 1994) (footnote
omitted). In this opinion, the California Supreme Court characterized the in-house
lawyer as having a dual allegiance, to the client/employer and to the public, under the
rules of ethics. The court recognized that this potential conflict exists for outside counsel
as well, but "outside lawyers enjoy a measure of professional distance and economic
independence that usually serves to lessen the pressure to bend or ignore professional
norms." Id. at 498. Thus the dilemma is really between the in-house counsel's position
as a lawyer and the in-house counsel's position as an employee.
324. HALL, supra note 127, at 91.
325. Id. at 96; cf. Heimovics & Herman, supra note 148, at 301 ("[The more
effective nonprofit chief executives have learned to use their boards as strategic tools to
mediate their organizations' environment, an environment that places the nonprofit
organization in a highly resource-dependent condition.").
326. Meyer & Rowan, supra note 252, at 48.
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business enterprises. " "
Even when founders or family members
dominated ownership, because of their lack of training they effectively lost
control: "As members of the boards of directors they did hold veto power.
They could say no, and they could replace the senior managers with other
career managers; but they were rarely in a position to propose positive
alternative solutions. " "
In many cases, professionalism homogenizes firms within an industry,
and, from the point of view of quality, diminishes the influence of
organizational form on the good or service provided.329 For example,
a medical procedure at a nonprofit hospital will tend to resemble the same
procedure at a for-profit hospital, because in both cases the medical care
is directed by a doctor. Moreover, to the extent professional standards go
beyond what might be necessary (think of all those tests doctors order),
it reduces the ability of competition to work an efficient deployment of
resources, and it reduces the ability of informed consumers to buy less
than what professionals want consumers to purchase.
We can cite many examples of the debate over professionalism.
Readers might be aware of arguments supporting and opposing teacher
certification in the public schools, or, in social work, the struggle between
professionalism and grassroots or self-help ("community"-based)
standards.33 We could even say we are seeing the professionalization
of professionalism.
Led by schools of public health, which by the 1960s were
attempting to upgrade and standardize hospital administration, the
movement has spread to business schools, which have initiated
programs in nonprofit management, as well as to the humanities,
where courses in museum management, public history, and the
administrative aspects of historic preservation are rapidly
becoming standard fare.33'
Finally, a professional identification subordinates loyalty to the
particular employing firm; in the aggregate, this reduces the importance
of organizational form.
Professor Hall observes that professional
managers "defined their goals in terms of their professional career
327. CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE HAND, supra note 214, at 9.

328. Id. at 10.
329. Thus, public law school professors resemble private law school professors, and
as a result public law schools resemble private.
330. See, e.g., Yaheskel Hasenfeld & Benjamin Gidron, Self-Help Groups and
Human Service Organizations:An InterorganizationalPerspective, 67 Soc. SERv. REv.
217 (1993).
331. HALL, supra note 127, at 94.
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interests."332 On its face, this might not be a bad thing because the
sector as a whole can improve as nonprofit managers move on from
smaller to larger nonprofits. But we should be particularly concerned
about the overlay of professionalism in labor-intensive industries with forprofit providers as well as nonprofits. As described above, this is because
the nondistribution constraint only effectively bars returns to capital, not
returns to labor. Where compensation can absorb receipts, the laborers
(even professionals) might not care whether the enterprise is proprietary
or nonprofit.333
The public commonly believes that nonprofit employees accept a
lower wage in order to work for an organization producing social benefits.
However, the studies on this issue generate mixed results.3" On the one
332. Id. at 96.
333. See, e.g., Holtmann & Idson, supra note 119, at 56 ("Because nonprofit
nursing homes are such a small part of the purchasers of registered nurses' services, they
have little economic incentive to pay other than the market wage for identical nurses-the
standard competitive labor market outcome.").
334. Anne E. Preston, The Nonprofit Worker in a For-Profit World, 7 J. LAB.
ECON. 438, 443 (1989) (the direction of the nonprofit wage differential cannot be
predicted, because it results from two opposing forces: the "demand" of managers
wanting to pay higher wages, and the supply of workers willing to donate a portion of
pecuniary compensation). Compare Burton A. Weisbrod, Nonprofit and Proprietary
Sector Behavior: Wage Differentials among Lawyers, 1 J. LAB. ECON. 246 (1983)
(public-interest lawyers deliberately sacrifice income that they could have earned in the
private sector in return for nonpecuniary benefits) with John H. Goddeeris, Compensating
Differentialsand Self-Selection: An Application to Lawyers, 96 J. POL. ECON. 411 (1988)
(no evidence that public interest lawyers could have earned more in the private sector);
see generallyRichard Steinberg, LaborEconomics and the Nonprofit Sector:A Literature
Review, 19 NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 151 (1990). Dick Netzer cautions
us against assuming too much about nonprofit compensation:
The stereotype is of artists who, on average, earn very little indeed as artists,
the "starving artist" stereotype immortalized in La Boheme. The only really
careful analysis of the question, a study by Filer (1986) using a large sample
from the 1980 Census, concluded that "artists do not appear to earn less than
other workers of similar training and personal characteristics" (p. 56) and that
there is no lifetime earnings penalty attached to the decision to enter the field
and stay in it.
Netzer, supra note 98, at 192 (citing to Randall K. Filer, The "StarvingArtist"-Myth
orReality? EarningsofArtists in the United States, 94 J. POL. EcON. 56 (1986)). Many
who work in the arts, such as actors and jazz musicians, are not actually employees of
any firm, but rather are hired for the run of a particular production. See Paul DiMaggio,
Nonprofit Organizations in the Production and Distribution of Culture, in THE
NONPROFIT SECTOR, supra note 17, at 195,216 ("Within nonprofit industries, firms tend
to employ artists or such aesthetic experts as curators directly, influencing their work
through hierarchical authority relations. By contrast, proprietary cultural industries
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hand, lower wages might constitute a voluntary "labor donation." 335 But
studies in the business sector show that if workers feel they are inequitably
underpaid, they respond variously by lowering the amount of their output,
or, if paid by the piece, the quality; in extreme situations they steal, and,
moreover, perceive "their stealing as being honest, [and] also completely
fair and justifiable. "336
Commented management professor Sharon

Oster, in the context of comparing for-profit and nonprofit outputs, "the
unobservability [of outputs] leads one to a choice of theft or sloth by the
provider.""
Finally, patterns of professionalism indicate that people

are using nonprofit service as a stepping stone to advancing in business,
with the low wages simply an investment in human capital.338

characteristically deal with artists by means of contract. .. ").
The wages/lifestyle trade-off also, of course, exists between proprietary firms. See,
e.g., LEIBENSTEIN, INSIDE THE FIRM, supra note 202, at 242:
It is possible to conceive of an organization that produces a maximum output,
or near-maximum output, but is not a maximum welfare organization.
Pressure for production may be so strong that some employees may prefer less
pressure, less output, and lower wages and working conditions, but they may
be caught up in a set of conventions, vertical relations, and short-run
incentives that do not allow them to individually choose a less pressured
working environment.
335. Besides the demands of donors and other sources of funds, the employees
themselves can demand low wages as the tradeoff for doing good. See, e.g., Eric J.
Wieffering, The Nonprofit Paycheck: Some Reformers Complain that Nonprofit CEOs
Make Too Much, But That Doesn't Square with the Marketplace, CORP. REP. MINN.,
Nov. 1993, 1, at 68, available in LEXIS, News Library, ASAPI file ("Hospital
executives . . . have an easier time defending their pay internally because just about
everybody connected with a hospital, from surgeon to orderly, knows that hospitals are
nonprofit in name only . . . . Executives at human service nonprofit agencies, or
membership or cultural organizations, are more likely to have a hard time justifying their
salaries internally than externally."); Alain C. Enthoven, Pricing Health Care: How
Employers Boost Health Care Costs, WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 1992, at A14.
336. Jerald Greenberg, Stealing in the Name of Justice: Informational and
Interpersonal Moderators of Theft Reactions to Underpayment Inequity, 54
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 81, 97 (1993) (experiment in
which college students, promised $5 for a task, were later told they would be paid $3;
when left to help themselves to their pay under circumstances suggesting impossibility
of detection, students tended to make up the difference, but stole less if the wage
reduction was communicated in a credible and sensitive way).
337. Sharon Oster in Sharon Oster & Estelle James, Comments, supra note 99, at
152-53.
338. YOUNG, supra note 184.
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5. Labor and Volunteers
Take two charities, one run well and one run badly, offering the same
social service. The one run badly (Charity B) "wastes" its resources, and
so is unable to produce the same quality and level of services as Charity
A (and, perhaps, is losing money overall). Who best observes this
performance? Charity B's employees and volunteers, who then might
decide to leave and work for Charity A. Indeed, Charity A benefits too,
because there now exists labor competing to be hired, and so Charity A
can either cut wages or obtain better workers.
Labor (whether paid or volunteer) can decide that Hospital A is
"better" than Hospital B as measured by many different criteria: more
stable, more responsive to the community, more whatever it is that the
worker values. Note that voting with your feet depends on what you
value: If you want only high pay and Hospital B pays more than Hospital
A, you will stay (assuming you believe that Hospital B can survive at this
rate); you might, alternatively, want to work where the hospital serves a
large charitable class. Thus, whether labor mobility serves as an effective
check on charitable waste of resources depends on what its
employees/volunteers value. In any event, we can presume that labor
(particularly executive labor) is best informed about the nonprofit's
operations.339
My hypothetical assumes that labor (paid or volunteer) is perfectly
mobile. If it is not, then labor movement provides an imperfect signal as
to nonprofit quality. In fact, labor economists believe that a worker has
a higher value in the "internal labor market" (where she currently works)
than in the external labor market. 3" The danger in relying on labor as
a monitoring device is that the worker has something very real at stake
unrelated to the organization-the paycheck (or r6sum6 value or other
benefit). As Albert Hirschman observed long ago, those who cannot exit
from a situation will start to convince themselves that things are not as bad
as they seem.341
To economist Richard Steinberg, volunteers of labor might make
better monitors than financial donors: "Unlike money, time donations
339. Cf. Preston, supra note 334, at 449 ("DV]orkers less closely tied to social
benefit provision in the organization are less likely to donate wages to nonprofit firms.
is no significant wage loss for clerical workers.").
.TMhere
[..
340. See, e.g., PETER B. DOERINGER & MICHAEL J. PIORE, INTERNAL LABOR
MARKETS AND MANPOWER ANALYSIS (1971).
341. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 199, at 93 (noting that where there are "[h]igh fees
for entering an organization and stiff penalties for exit," the member "may have a
considerable stake in self-deception, that is, in fighting the realization that the
organization he belongs to ... [is] deteriorating").
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provide the donor with training, skill certification, social opportunities,
control over nonprofit output, and information about the quality and
efficiency of the recipient charity." 2
On the other hand, as we saw with money donors, the very power
permitted volunteers might make them unreliable quality signalers. "You
often can't order low-paid staff and volunteers to do their jobs; you have
to persuade them through consensus. " 343 In many cases, charities are
reluctant to review the performance of their volunteers.'
Peter
Drucker, though, sees the opposite trend in the increasing
professionalization of volunteers: "[T]his new breed requires, indeed,
demands, . . . training, training, and more training.... They expect to
be consulted and to participate in making decisions that affect their work
and the work of the organization as a whole. . . . [A] good many
nonprofits have developed career ladders for their volunteers."4 5 In this
case, however, the more the volunteers invest in organization-specific
human capital, the more they risk the "lock-in" of paid workers.
D. Summary of Nonprofit Accountability
In this part, we found that nonprofit "accountability" is a difficult
question. Accountable to whom? For what? 6 While nonprofits as
suppliers of goods and services must respond to their customers, and as
employers must respond to their professional staff and employees, the
342. Richard Steinberg, Does GovernmentSpending Crowd OutDonations?,in THE
NONPROFIT SECTOR INTHE MIXED ECONOMY, supra note 100, at 99, 114. Steinberg
also argues because a time-volunteer can observe the marginal impact of her contribution,
volunteers should be equally willing to donate time to a for-profit enterprise. But
volunteer time cannot be guaranteed to have the full marginal impact-the volunteer still
doesn't necessarily know if her input crowds out other good activities, and simply gives
the organization a cushion to waste. See Hansmann, Economic Theories of Nonprofit
Organization, supra note 17, at 36 (Professor Hansmann's example of cash donations to
listener-sponsored radio).
343. John Byrne, Finding Your Niche in Nonprofits, Bus. WK., May 21, 1990, at
170.
344. Holly Hall, Evaluating Volunteers: It May Be Tricky, but It Can Pay Off, 5
CHRON. PHILANTHROPY 30 (1993).
345. Drucker, supra note 188, at 92.
346. See Laura B. Chisolm, Accountability of Nonprofit Organizationsand Those
Who Control Them: The Legal Framework, 6 NONPROFIT MGMT. & LEADERSHIP 141,
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same types of resource dependency affect for-profit firms. Accordingly,
we also examined whether nonprofits are accountable to their donors and
volunteers, in a way similar to the way businesses are accountable to
shareholders. As a threshold matter, we must recall that many nonprofits
rely only to a small degree on donations, and fewer still rely on a single
or small group of donors. Effectively, then, nonprofits generally are as
untethered to their donors as large for-profit firms are to their
shareholders. Nor, as a legal matter, do donors maintain control over
contributed amounts. However, as a practical matter, nonprofits that do
depend on future donations must satisfy (or appear to be satisfying) this
key resource. Finally, as a normative matter, nonprofit accountability to
donors might not be the most socially useful arrangement because of the
separation of donor from beneficiary, and because of general public
ignorance of the needs of nonprofits.
V. CONCLUSION

A nonprofit organization is a firm. But it is, by law, a firm without
claimants to residual profits. This Article examined the economic
consequences to an organization of having to operate under such a
"nondistribution constraint."
The standard economic account of the nonprofit sector credits the
nondistribution constraint with overcoming public reluctance to make
donations or to obtain services in light of information asymmetry. In
short, nonprofit status serves as a bond of trustworthiness where the donor
or patron cannot judge the quality of the result.
Unfortunately, though, the nondistribution constraint cannot guarantee
that the nonprofit operates better or worse than a proprietary enterprise in
overcoming information asymmetries. The absence of shareholders
demanding profits enables the organization to relax into productive
inefficiencies, or to cross-subsidize activities the patron would not want
to pay for (could she only observe them). Such inefficiencies or crosssubsidization might "cost" more than the profits the enterprise might
otherwise distribute to shareholders if it operated in a proprietary form.
Moreover, in an industry with more than one nonprofit, the
nondistribution constraint cannot help patrons choose between competing
nonprofits.
In comparing the organization and operations of nonprofits in light of
how proprietary businesses function, we learned that the two sectors are
much more similar than conventionally believed.
Firms, whether
nonprofit or proprietary (or even public), are subject to many of the same
economic forces, such as resource dependency, institutional isomorphism,
and organizational slack. We also saw that even in the absence of
shareholders somebody still has to run the enterprise: to decide what
objectives to pursue, and how; to manage its financial and human
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resources; and to span the boundaries of the organization in interacting
with the key constituencies, other organizations, and the public. While
nonprofits have no shareholders privileged with rights of accountability,
we saw that in most of the business sector shareholders have long lost
effective control over firm management. In short, management in both
sectors has decisional authority, whether de facto, as in the proprietary
sector, or de jure, as in the nonprofit sector.
In many ways, the formal legal and economic differences between
nonprofit organizations and proprietary firms are more of degree than of
kind. Does this mean that the law should be amended to treat nonprofits
more like business corporations, and that tax and other subsidies should
be repealed? Perhaps, but we should hesitate to design changes based
solely on the implicationsfrom economics. Rather, the economic account
of organizational form provides only one aspect of the story. Other
influences on nonprofit organizations, and the people who deal with them,
come from a variety of historical, political, psychological, religious,
sociological, and legal institutions.
From these perspectives, the
differences between the sectors currently are often very real, although
intersectoral interpenetration blurs the boundaries.347 The challenge to
the nonprofit sector is reconciling these other institutional influences with
conflicting economic goals, and convincing the public that nonprofit
organizations continue to remain deservingly "different." Should the
public cease to view enterprises in terms of their organizational form, we
would likely see subsidies tailored more towards worthy outputs by all
enterprises, owned and unowned. Society might conclude, for example,
that transforming monolithic tax exemption into targeted output subsidies
makes more efficient and fair use of collective resources.

347. See Brody, supra note 5.

